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ELECTORAL SYSTEMS IN TURKEY AND THEIR IMPACT ON ELECTIONS

Suggestions from the Perspective of Political Liberties

Tanju Tosun

In collaboration with
Friedrich Naumann
STIFTUNG **FÜR DIE FREIHEIT**

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The most essential value that individuals need in order to shape their lives within the frame of their beliefs, wishes, abilities and dreams is “freedom”. Without freedom, individuals cannot put their tangible, intangible and intellectual potential into practice. In an environment without liberties, individuals are obliged to live the lives that others choose for them. Without doubt, such a life takes away individuals right to “seek happiness”.

There are three main dimensions to freedom: Civil, economic and political Civil liberties include liberties such as freedom of thought and expression, freedom of religion or belief, freedom of assembly, freedom of movement and allow individuals to go on with their lives in civil society as they wish without any interference from governments or other individuals.

Economic liberties includes individuals’ right to utilize their bodies, themselves and possessions over movable-immovable properties to their heart’s content. Thanks to economic liberties, individuals can achieve the facilities they need in order to build their lives as they wish.

Finally, political liberties include rights such as right to elect and be elected, right to found political parties. Individuals, based on these liberties, acquire rights to be involved at the decision making processes of decisions regarding their own lives at public sphere. At a political system where political liberties are constrained, individuals are deprived of chance to contribute to making of decisions that will lead their lives for the better in public sphere; oppose, defy regulations that may be opposed to them.

Democratic political systems are those where political liberties are granted. Yet, in such systems, legislative regulations such as electoral law and political parties law may limit political liberties significantly. At this study which has been put to pen by Prof. Tanju Tosun, “electoral systems” which have considerable affects on political liberties are addressed and political consequences of various electoral systems are probed especially on the basis of “fairness in representation”. A political system with superior fairness in representation may be considered to have high political participation and representation and hence high level of political liberties.

Turkey is a democracy where political liberties are considerably constrained by legislative regulations. The electoral system currently practiced in Turkey constitutes a significant obstacle in front of political participation and representation with its 10% countrywide threshold and in turn in front of political freedom.

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With a reform implemented in order to ensure “fairness in representation” without ignoring principle of governmental stability, one of the fundamental cornerstones of individual freedom in Turkey, “political liberties”, may be reinforced. In addition to reinforcing individual freedom, such a reform would contribute to the rise of Turkey among the World democracies. In this context, this study titled “Electoral Systems in Turkey and Their Impact on Elections: Suggestions from the Perspective of Political Liberties” part of the Liberal Perspective: Report series of Freedom Research Association aims to shed light on electoral system debates that climbed high to the top of the agenda in Turkey following June 7th, 2015 general elections.

Respectfully,

Assoc. Prof. Bican Şahin

Chair of the Executive Board of Freedom Research Association

ABSTRACT

Electoral systems are institutional arrangements that provide information on the level of a country's democracy and political freedom standards. Electoral systems having majoritarian, proportional representation or hybrid qualities is related to the countries' historical situations, preference of political elite and socio-economic structures. While at every election held after 1961 in Turkey the parliamentary body had been formed using proportional representation method, threshold reinforced proportional representation system which was used partially in 1960-80 period and which is used at every elections today enabled representation of primarily powerful parties in the parliament, this in turn leads to a common representative fairness in context of elector-electee relation. The fact that Turkey places "administrative principles" next "fairness in representation" in its constitution and electoral laws makes it hard to ensure representation of political differences and make majoritarianism dominant. The picture drawn before us on June 7th shows that there will be no easy way out of 4 party parliamentary politics in the coming period. If any changes to be made on electoral system has a reinforcing effect on fairness in representation, these may serve to enhance political liberties and thus our democracy.

MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE OF ELECTIONS

Elections, considered to be the distinguishing feature of democratic politics¹ is the primary one among the instruments that legitimize a government. As the governed determine the political power through their votes at the elections, a democratic process is actualized. In this process, they may approve the existing government just as they may refuse and replace it. Regardless of their choice, since elections play a mediating role at designating a government, they are encountered as an irreplaceable component of democracy. Importance of elections are especially high at regimes grounded on the point of view that the source of a government is based on public. This is due to the people's delegation of its sovereignty to their chosen representatives. It must also be stated that there may be no relation between the concept of election and democracy. However there is an indissoluble bond between all democratic regimes and elections. While elections at authoritarian regimes submit the parties that are wardens of the regime to the approval of electors, electors do not have any other choice other than voting therefor. Yet,

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the governed at democratic regimes should have the right to make a choice among multiple options. For elections are held freely, under neutral conditions and in a competitive environment. In all elections, some kind of “bilateral discussion” (dialog) takes place between politicians on one side and electors on the other.

As for the competition engaged for the sake of votes, they constitute the essence of the election. In a setting devoid of competition, an election is not even a matter of discussion; at the most, there could be a forced consent conforming to the requirements of a dictatorship.²A set of conditions must be set in order for elections to be held freely, under neutral conditions and in a competitive environment. First and foremost, democratic elections reach significance when conditions respecting human rights and liberties are provided, which means that it is out of question to consider elections, where these liberties are not guaranteed, free and neutral. Such liberties may vary from freedom of organization, to register as a elector, party or candidate to not oppressing electors, from the right to cast secret votes to not factionalize at election management, from electoral laws to be under constitutional security to give just coverage to parties’ electoral news on media, from equal treatment by government and its institutions to parties, candidates and electors to not oppress them.

Only when the governed is able to utilize its right to supervise political power through elections do the elections carry a democratic significance. This is due to fact that it is only possible to put primary characteristic features of democracy, in other words participation, freedom and equality, to practice is through a voting mechanism.³Another thing that must be stated is that, it is seen the features sought in order for elections to be free and neutral cannot be established completely even in democratic regimes. Especially regarding campaigns, unfair competition arises between parties due to difference of financing of politics, and this, in turn, weakens the foundation required to conduct elections in a just and competitive environment. Moreover, another important issue pertaining to the issue is the electoral systems practiced. Those in power in some countries make changes, which would disrupt fairness in representation, on electoral laws to ensure their domination, and resort to regulations in their favors and this in turn harms the democratic nature of elections.

Even though the electors tend to vote for varied reasons, elections or the act of voting would bear various social and political results. First of all, it would become obvious that who will use the political power that will rule the country. On the other hand, it would only be possible to hold the political power to account, hold them liable, approve or disapprove

the actions of those in power, through elections.⁴ Within this context, we can think of elections as a connection between those who make the political decisions and those affected by these decisions. Electing and joining elections indicates the levels of both the interest of electors towards public administration, and public consensus element that must be present in the nature of political powers.⁵ Electors shape their choices at the elections not according to a solid decision but rather according to who or what political staff they prefer would take such decisions.

Thus, the public elects the persons that seek to serve them. Therefore, the main factor underlying the voting of electors is to ensure that the persons who will come into power are those who will provide better conditions for their future.⁶ Elections consist of three different processes. Elections are considered to be fights for power between various social groups on one hand and also an activity that effects the formation of a parliament as well as a political event that reflect the personal choices of electors.⁷ In this context, political parties are considered to be a social group that assumes the role of representative of different interests. They appear before electors during electoral periods depending on their ideological stance, and promise that they will bring the demands of the demands of their electors to political arena and develop policies to fulfill such demands in case they come into power. Elections become races that are joined in order to come into power due to the activities of parties that take part at elections during election process. The position of parties in parliament is determined at the choices of electors in the election box, parties are entitled to be represented in the parliament according to the votes they have received. In this sense, one of the most essential political mechanisms that administer establishment of representative bodies at democratic regimes is elections. Thus, it would be more appropriate to think of elections as both indicator of true democracy as well as deformity of democratic process. As for the deformity, its level largely varies depending on the electoral systems practiced.

Electoral system can be generally defined as a collection of techniques, principles and rules utilized to designate the representatives of public.

ELECTORAL SYSTEMS

Although elections are an indivisible part of the politics, they are still a technical matters and are subject to a set of rules. Techniques, voting manner and calculation method of results are significant influencing factors on the results of an election. Electoral system can be generally defined as a collection of techniques, principles and rules utilized to designate the representatives of public. Sartori defines electoral sys-

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tems as systems that determine how the seats within a parliament will be distributed between political parties, and if present representatives at the parliament, as a result of votes cast at elections.⁸ There are 2 distinguishable main election system types; *majoritarian systems and proportional representation systems*. In addition, we can also mention of *mixed (parallel) electoral systems* created by incorporating a set of features from each of these two systems. Each of these three types are distinguishable from each other. As for the answer to the question of “which electoral systems are practiced under which conditions”, it would depend on social and demographic conditions, and political and ideological tendencies of a country.

There is a wide belief that proportional representation systems mostly serve the equality principle and aim to ensure that each vote is represented in the parliament however increase instability, and that majoritarian systems, to the contrary, provide stability however do not place great emphasis on equality and representation principles.

1. Majoritarian System

Majoritarian system can be defined in principle as the system where the candidate who receives at least one more than half of votes of the electors. Still, this definition refers to the *absolute majority* concept. In other words, absolute majority means more than half of a whole. As for *simple majority*, that means more than others. Absolute majority is more challenging to be practiced compared to simple majority since if more than two candidates are present within an electoral district, it would be not easy for a candidate to receive more than half of total votes.

Another concept pertaining to majoritarian system that must be addressed is the *electoral district*. Electoral district is designated depending on demographical, geographical and social conditions of each country. At its simplest, electoral districts are the regions which are designated according to the foregoing criteria and of which electoral results are calculated separately within itself by taking into account ease of practice. ⁹Sometimes electoral districts may cover the whole country. For instance, at an election for the head of a state, the whole country is taken as the electoral district. On the other hand, usually, the provinces are designated as electoral district, as is practiced in our country, at parliamentary elections. Metropolises may be divided to several electoral districts. For example, in our country, Istanbul is divided to three and Ankara and Izmir each are divided into two electoral districts.

Majority systems stands out with its different practices such as single

member district plurality, majority runoff, alternative vote and block vote. At single member district plurality system, each electoral district elects one representative in an assembly and electoral districts consist of small areas.¹⁰ In other words, at these single member electoral districts, the candidate who receives the (simple or absolute) majority of votes is elected as representative and each electoral district is entitled to appoint only one representative. Single Member District Plurality is the system with which the candidate who receives the (simple) majority of the votes among other candidates competing at single polling in an electoral district wins the elections, thus attains the post of representative. Therefore this practice is also known as “First Past the Post”. This system is practiced in British House of Commons Election, Election for Presidency of Singapore, Canada and India general elections. Another practice of single member district plurality is Alternative Vote system which, unlike simple majority, enables electors to rank candidates on their preferences. Instead of plurality principle, it is based on the principle of one candidate’s receiving majority of votes and is executed in one ballot, in addition it enables to make a preference rating-order.

Its most typical example is Australia general elections. With Majority Runoff system is carried out in two stages, in case no candidate attains majority of the votes by himself/herself, the candidates who attained a certain majority rate (e.g. 25%) or a certain number of candidates with the most votes in the first stage race again at the second stage and the one who receives the most number of votes is elected. Presidential elections in France is executed with this method.¹¹

Multi member plurality systems are electoral methods where electoral districts are broader and parties take part at elections with a list. In such systems, lists compete instead of candidates. The candidates in the list with the most votes are elected. Multi member plurality systems split up into two variants within itself, these being candidate based bloc vote and party based bloc vote. With the candidate based bloc vote system, electors may form a list of their own by voting for different candidates of various parties. As for the party based bloc vote system, electors vote for parties and the list of the party that is victorious at the electoral district is deemed to have been elected. This system is practiced in countries such as Bermuda, Laos, Thailand, Kuwait and Philippines among others.¹²

If absolute majority principle is the basis for a majoritarian system, regardless of whether the elections are single member or multi member, they are practiced in *two ballots*. This is due to the fact that reaching absolute majority is challenging. In an election, if none of the candi-

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dates manage to reach absolute majority in the first ballot, then a second ballot is performed. Two candidates who received the most votes in first stage or the candidates who received more votes than a certain percentage are compete at the second ballot.

The main argument brought against the majoritarian system is that it causes the electors to not get the worth of their votes in the parliament. For example, in an election where multi member party-based

block vote majoritarian system, if a party has received fifty-one percent of votes in an electoral district that elects twenty representatives for an assembly, that party gains the right to all the seats of that particular district in the assembly. The remaining forty-nine percent of votes are thus not represented in the assembly. In turn, those twenty representatives in that electoral district are entitled to the seats of the assembly without receiving votes from all of the district. This is an issue that goes against the principle of fairness in representation. On the other side, the positive aspect of majoritarian/plurality systems are their contribution to the formation of stable governments. If more representatives are elected from parties according to majoritarian principle, coalition governments will not be encountered often and in turn, this will lead to stability of the government.

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On the other side, the positive aspect of majoritarian/plurality

2. Proportional Representation

Proportional representation system provides better fairness in representation compared to majority-plurality system.

This is because it allows parties to have representatives in proportion to the vote rate they receive. To the contrary of the majoritarian system, with this system small parties may also have sats at a parliament and the votes of the electors are represented more justly in the parliament. As such, the political freedom principle which constitute the freedom of citizens to elect and be elected is reflected more with proportional representation system. However, the biggest issue with proportional representation system is that it provides grounds for coalition governments as it allows more parties to enter a parliament.

Proportional representation system varies according to what vote rate representatives will be seated at a parliamentary and whether a threshold will be enforced. Whether the system is practiced with a threshold has a direct impact on election results. The threshold may be enforced

in two forms: National threshold is the method which rules out parties which do not reach a certain vote rate throughout the country from being taken into account. Electoral district threshold is the same method however its range is constrained to electoral districts. A party or candidate which could not attain a certain vote rate in an electoral is not taken into consideration for parliament seats. Due to such a threshold practiced in our country, parties which fail to attain at least 10% of the votes throughout the country are not entitled to send representatives to the assembly.

A second important issue regarding proportional representation system is to determine with what vote rate representatives will be appointed. Three methods are exercised in order to determine this rate. First of these is the *electoral district quota method*, with this method, the rate is calculated by dividing the number of valid votes in an electoral district by the number of representatives to be allocated. Second is the fixed quota method, with this method, election board or legislature pre-determines a number regardless of electoral districts. Dividing total number of votes by this fixed number equals the total seats at a parliament. For example, if election board predetermines the number of 50,000, this means that each 50,000 votes would allocate a representative. With the third and last method, *the national quota method*, the quota is calculated by dividing the number of valid votes in the nation by the number of representative to be allocated.

the biggest issue with proportional representation system is that it provides grounds for coalition governments as it allows more parties to enter a parliament.

As is seen, by dividing the number of votes by the quota determined using one of the three methods above, number of seats that party will have in the parliament is calculated. Still at this point the issue is that the number of votes are not always multiples of the quota. Therefore the remainder of votes need to be somehow distributed. This distribution may be made using *largest remainder method (quota)* and *highest average method (denominator)* or (*d'Hondt*). With the *largest remainder method*, after the number of votes received by parties are divided by the quota, remainder of the votes are ranked in ascending order and representatives are allocated according to this ranking.

This system is practiced in countries such as Brazil, Ireland, Malta and Australia with some variations. As to the *highest average method (d'Hondt)*, first, the number of votes parties received is divided by certain numbers until the result equals the number of seats. A table is created using the results thereof and the quotients which equal the

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number of representatives to be elected is taken as the new quota and representatives are distributed accordingly. This system is practiced in Israel, Spain and Austria among other countries including Turkey.

3. Mixed Electoral System

With this system, one part of the legislature is determined according to the representative distribution made using an electoral system based on the principles of single member district plurality or majority run-off while the other part using a system based on multi member proportional representation. Germany, Lithuania, Georgia, Russia, Ukraine, Scotland and Wales (additional member system) electoral systems may be cited as an example of mixed electoral system ¹³.

4. National Remainder System

This system which was exercised in 1965 elections in our country benefits the small parties the most and prevents the votes to go down the drain. With this system, the votes not taken into account are collected on the national level and are divided by unallocated number of seats to find a new rate (quota) and using this rate number of unallocated seats are allocated. This system enables all parties to find place in an assembly proportionally with their national total votes.

ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND PARTY SYSTEMS

Among projections attempting to explain the impact of institutional arrangements such as electoral system on politics of a country and form and operation of competing parties, the ones initially catching the eye are those of French political scientist Maurice Duverger.

1. “Duverger Law”

According to Duverger, *raison d'être* of a party system in a country is closely connected with that country's electoral system in addition to socio-economical, historical and cultural factors. While the position of electoral system among the determinants of number of parties is important, this determinant is secondary compared to socio-economical and cultural factors.¹⁴In this sense, the more determinant factors are national facts, ideologies and socio-economical structure of a country and the role of electoral system in this structuring would be facilitative or inhibitive at most.¹⁵

The author formulates the relation between electoral system and party system as follows:

1- Proportional representation promotes a multi-party system constituted of solid, independent and stable (except emotional waves) parties; 2- Majority runoff promotes a multi-party system constituted of mild, dependent and relatively stable (in all cases) parties; 3-One ballot simple majority system promotes a two-party system in which rulership changes hand between big independent parties»¹⁶.

Although this generalization seems like a hypothesis aiming to explain the cause-effect relation at first glance, as he himself states, this effect corresponds to the function of a brake or throttle pedal. Duverger says that the relation between electoral systems and party systems is most apparent at single ballot majority system and due to correlation between this system and these two party systems, a real sociological law is approached.¹⁷

According to the author, the reason why majority system promotes two-party system is due to two factors, one being mechanical and other being psychological. *“Mechanical factors is based on third (weakest) party’s under-representation, which is its seat percentage being lower than vote percentage”*.¹⁸ In other words, just as the system works against a party trying to compete against two major parties, it also prevents it from developing. The natural consequence thereof is excessive and consistent under-representation of parties other than the most powerful two in a parliament.¹⁹ This mechanical factor which is present at majoritarian system also leads to activation of a psychological factor for electors and *“electors who keep voting for the third party in a three-party system working with single-ballot majority method realize soon that their votes will be wasted in case they keep working for the third party. Therefore in order to prevent their nemesis from being victorious, without doubt they would tend to vote for the lesser of two evils”*.²⁰ On the other side, as well as single-ballot majority method would bring properties to existing two-party system that would prevent old parties from being divided and new ones from being formed, in case there are parties which has local support or more powerful national organization, this system would have an effect that could reestablish the two-party system which is corrupted with emergence of a third party.²¹

According to Duverger’s projection, electoral systems which pave the way for multi-party system are majority runoff or proportional presentation systems. Almost all of the countries that adopted majority runoff have a multi-party system with only exception being Belgium. This state in Belgium is due to the division between Catholic Party and Liberal being based on a sociological factor such as church-government division in addition to stable and discipline nature of the parties in Bel-

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gium.²² The author argues that variety of the parties which has similar political tendencies or, with his own words, “*variety of neighboring parties do not impact the total number of votes thereof for the parties may always regroup at the runoff.*”

*Polarization or under-representation issues do not play a part here either or they only do at the runoff; at the initial ballot each party preserves its luck as is’.*²³ In this sense, runoff system runs at a more individualistic way and therefore parties divide within themselves more.²⁴ The most significant effect of this system is that by running in a disciplinary manner for off-system parties, it causes too few candidates to be able to receive absolute majority in the first ballot and thus makes electoral alliances at the runoff a practical necessity. Thus the extreme parties which stay out or are excluded from such alliances usually obtain fewer seats from their vote rates.²⁵



If there is a multi-party tendency in a community, a conclusion such as that the reason of multi-party system is proportional representation cannot be drawn. However, it can be said that this system does not hinder such a tendency and in this sense enables or facilitates the multi-party system.

According to Duverger who states that proportional representation promotes multi-party system, in no country is it seen that this system establishes or maintains a two-party system. On one hand proportional representation builds a barrier in front of all developments leading to two-party system while on the other hand it leads to consequences which boost the number of parties. If there is a multi-party tendency in a community, a conclusion such as that the reason of multi-party system is proportional representation cannot be drawn. However, it can be said that this system does not hinder such a tendency and in this sense enables or facilitates the multi-party system.²⁶

Another question that the author is seeking answer for is regarding the limits of proportional representation's effects. According to him, while it is not possible to deny the fact that proportional representation has a multiplier effect, the significance of this effect is not that great. On the other hand, there must be a distinction between whether proportional representation has been implemented before or after a runoff system promoting multi-party system since as things stand in the first state multiplying effect is not as apparent as that in the second state.²⁷ In this sense, it can be derived that contrary to what is suggested, proportional system does not have a dividing effect and this effect be seen with formation of new small parties instead of divisions of old parties.²⁸

Another thing that needs to be addressed in the context of electoral

systems' effects on party systems is the nature and direction of the change at the social structure. While proportional representation affects the lifespan and durability of the governments with polarized pluralist party systems avoid of social uniformity where centrifugal tendencies are strong and ideological conflicts are common and thus pushes such governments to instability, it is hard to claim that this system leads to governmental instability at countries where centrifugal tendencies are strong and parties represent the divisions in the society. Italy, Weimar Republic, French Fourth Republic can be given as examples for first state and Federal Germany, Holland, Ireland, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Switzerland can be given as examples for the second.²⁹

Although Hermans and Milnor claim that electoral systems would affect governmental stability through party systems and this is the main indicator of a stable democracy ³⁰, in the final analysis, it must be taken into account that effects of electoral system on both cases would be meaningful only when assessed together with social conditions. In fact, even these researchers do not rule out the impact of political extremism or moderation related to cultural fragmentation as a determinant of governmental instability.³¹ Belgium and Sweden examples show that these countries headed towards stable governments after adopting proportional representation.

2. Assessment of Duverger Law

Various criticisms are directed at hypotheses that Duverger developed on the effect of electoral systems on form and operation of party systems in various Western European Countries, primarily USA and England. The criticisms are mainly focused on the following aspects: As it is not possible to claim that the relation between majority system and two-party system is perfect, several sociological factors shine through among the factors leading to two-party system as the author acknowledges in his Belgium example. With regards to these factors and especially on the two-party system in England, Lipson *points out to the fact that the social order of the country is relatively uniform and not much opportunity is given for multiple parties to appear*. In fact, according to Lipson, it is apparent that party system determines the electoral system and that England has imported the party system established by this cause-effect relation in a long time to New Zealand, Australia, and S. Africa.³²

Among England, New Zealand, USA, Colombia, Malta and Venezuela where two-party system is present while only three countries (England, New Zealand and USA) adopted majoritarian system, the rest of the

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countries practice proportional representation system to form the legislature. On the other hand, while two-party system had been present until World War II in Canada which applies majoritarian system, after the war two-and-a-half-party system³³ has been dominant in the country. That being the case, it would seem that the relation between majoritarian system (especially single-ballot majority system) and two-party system is not as powerful a Duverger claims.

Also, mechanical affect of majority system only comes into play in case third and other parties have a limited regional foundation. Stronger the regional foundation, bigger the representation chance. This sentence would especially be useful in explaining Canada example. Indeed, Duverger also states that main effects of majority system is constrained to regional basis while addressing Canada example.³⁴ In this sense, as Özbudun states, “...majority system can accord with existence of small parties of regional or local nature.

*In fact this system, by enabling regional parties to seize all or majority of the seats of that region in the parliament, may give the said parties more power than what they would gain with proportional representation”.*³⁵

In the hypothesis of Duverger claiming that, in a sociological expression, *Dualist* countries practiced majoritarian system, it is not possible to say that there is a direct causal relation between social fraction patterns and majoritarian system. Thus it must be stated that at communities where there is a single division line, two-party system is not established and this countries adopted the majoritarian system. On the other hand, it is not possible to claim that gravitating towards majority system at many examples of divided party system would bring about two-party system. For example, during 3rd Republic period in France, the system running with regional based parties have not turned into a two-party system.

Leys bring the most salient argument against causal relation of Duverger and claims that the hypotheses proposed are imperfect in all reason and are *impossible to be utilized*. According to him, “*the impact of majority system manifests on regional level only instead of national level. Mechanical and psychological factors cause the supporters of a third or a weaker party in a certain electoral district to abandon this party and gravitate towards either the party ranking first or second at the electoral district. However there is no grounds for the party occupying the first place at all electoral districts to be the same party*”³⁶.

On the other hand, majority system’s tendency to decrease number

of parties in the system may come into question in case electors are engaged primarily in national political system rather than local or regional systems. As was observed during France Third Republic period, in the event that political competition completely becomes regional, *mechanical and psychological* factors would become difficult to operate. In settings with strong regional identities and divisions, third or fourth parties may rise and protect their existence. For both factors would be present only when there is a moderate division and thus a pure two-party system will not be managed to be achieved just as Canada example. In USA, congressional system has prevented deterioration of the two-party setting that could have occurred due to regional division which was dominant from mid 19th century until mid 20th century. However, as can be observed with 1960s Western Germany party system example, in settings where national political orientations are present, discipline of majoritarian system may tend to decrease the number of parties.

According to Rae, although electoral systems have various effects on party systems, there is also the fact of various common effects: While all of the electoral systems lead to over-representation of big parties and under-representation of small parties, three main features of this tendency stand out from others:

1- Each electoral system tends to generate disproportional results, 2- Each electoral system, when compared to the number of parties partaking at the election, tends to increase the effectiveness of parties at a parliament and, 3- Each electoral system may generate a parliamentary majority for parties which could not receive the support of majority of electors and this tendency is especially more strong at proportional and absolute majority systems compared to proportional representation.

Although each electoral system tends to prevent division in the parliament and reward big parties in order to achieve this, it can be said that this case is especially true for single member, single ballot majority systems.³⁷ While Powell does not object to this projection of Rae, based on his findings on division at party systems which he derived by examining social conditions of various countries, Powell emphasizes on social uniformity in parallel with sociological approach rather than electoral system and claims that proportional representation system would not allow the existence of multi-parties in case uniformity takes precedence in the context of issue scales. When *Duverger Law* is assessed together with positive and negative arguments on it, we can say that while the electoral system to be adopted is not the sole determinant of establishment of party systems, it still is an important factor.

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CRITERIA OF ELECTORAL SYSTEM SELECTION AND RESULTS THEREOF

While choosing electoral systems, various criteria are utilized according to the purposes of decision makers. Factors such as socio-economic structure, political conditions, nature of political regimes, and anticipation of political power of countries are determinants in this choice. Simultaneously, these are considered to be the goals of electoral systems and political scientist Horowitz mentions 6 goals in respect thereof, namely: proportionality of seats to votes, accountability, formation of stable governments, victory of condorcet winners, interethnic and interreligious conciliation and representation of minorities.³⁸ Chosen criteria lead to less or more political results at final analysis and the most significant of these results pertain to the number of parties represented at an assembly and degree of disproportion of the system.³⁹



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A high degree of representational unfairness would indicate that citizens can not enforce their “political liberties” which allow them to make political contribution. The main factors leading thereto are; unrepresented votes and disproportionality. When the votes supporting a party or a political view are left out of the parliament due to the various features of electoral system, then that would mean there are unrepresented votes present there. Increasing rate of said votes would transform into a representation issue after a certain point.⁴⁰ Since the parties which receive the majority of votes in majoritarian systems occupy all of the seats, unrepresented vote issue is more apparent in such systems. Still, this should not be understood as that there are no representational unfairness issues with proportional representation systems. Especially whether an election threshold exists and if true the size of the threshold, whether the threshold is nation-wide or regional, size of the electoral district and seat calculation formula may lead to unfairness in representation at proportional representation systems. Yet once again, it must be stated that the primary determinant of the unfairness is disproportionality. As a matter of fact, while Holland, where the election threshold is around 1 percent, has the least amount of disproportionality; in Poland where the threshold is 5 percent, disproportionality is a major issue. Especially, election threshold in conjunction with electoral district

size causes further representative unfairness. There is an inverse proportion between the size of electoral district and disproportionality, and the state which is named “effective electoral threshold” by Taagepera and reached by having the both present at the same time is the final manifestation of unfairness in representation.⁴¹

When we address the issue in terms of proportionality of vote distribution to seat distribution, adopted electoral systems lead to proportionality or disproportionality between the rate of votes of parties established with choices of electors and the rate of parliamentarians of parties shaped by electoral system. As the disproportionality increases, the representation of votes that parties received decreases at the same rate. This indicates to a deviation between the rates of parties’ votes and their parliamentarians and thus political scientists such as Douglas W. Rae, John Loosemoore and Victor J. Hanby, Michael Gallaver, Bernard Grof-man, Arend Lijphart have developed various formulas that measure the level of disproportionality.⁴²

Effective numbers of parties are also informative on political consequences of electoral systems. Majoritarian or proportional representation nature of practiced electoral systems is influencing on the scale of effective numbers of parties. The fact that Lijphart has determined effective number of parliamentary parties in a simple majority system as 2,1 and in proportional representation systems as 3,8 in his study on 21 stable and developed democracies between 1945-1980 is important as it reveals the relation of simple majority system with two-party system and proportional representation system with multiple-party system.

The author, while studying the effects of electoral systems on number of parties, uses the “effective number of parties” instead of their plain numbers. According to Özbudun, the reason of this is that appearance of some smaller parties in parliament in addition to two big parties would not affect the two-party nature of the system. For example, while parties other than the two big parties are always represented at British House of Commons, the country is still one of the most typical examples of two-party system.⁴³

The average found by Lijphart by studying legislature elections held between 1945-1996 at 36 democracies show that the disproportionality levels differ greatly according to adopted electoral systems. Findings pertaining to the case is presented on Table 1.

Especially whether an election threshold exists and if true the size of the threshold, whether the threshold is nation-wide or regional, size of the electoral district and seat calculation formula may lead to unfairness in representation at proportional representation systems.

TABLE 1: AVERAGE ELECTION DISPROPORTIONALITY SCORES USED AT LEGISLATURE ELECTIONS DURING 1945-96 PERIOD AT 36 DEMOCRACIES

Country	Disproportion Degree	Electoral System	Country	Disproportion Degree	Electoral System
Holland	1.30	Proportional Representation	Spain	8.15	Proportional Representation
Denmark	1.83	Proportional Representation	Australia	9.26	Absolute Maj.
Sweden	2.09	Proportional Representation	P. New Guinea	10.06	Proportional Representation
Israel	2.27	Proportional Representation	England	10.33	Proportional Representation
Malta	2.36	P.R.-Remainder vote	Colombia	10.62	Proportional Representation*
Austria	2.47	Proportional Representation	New Zealand	11.11	Proportional Representation
Germany	2.52	Proportional Representation	India	11.38	Proportional Representation
Switzerland	2.53	Proportional Representation	Canada	11.72	Proportional Representation
Finland	2.93	Proportional Representation	Botswana	11.74	Proportional Representation
Belgium	3.24	Proportional Representation	Costa Rica	13.65	Proportional Representation*
Italy	3.25	Proportional Representation	Trinidad	13.66	Proportional Representation
Luxembourg	3.26	Proportional Representation	Venezuela	14.41	Proportional Representation
Ireland	3.45	P.R.-Remainder vote	U.S.A.	14.91	Proportional Representation
Portugal	4.04	Proportional Representation	Bahamas	15.47	Proportional Representation
Iceland	4.25	Proportional Representation	Barbados	15.75	Proportional Representation
Norway	4.93	Proportional Representation	Mauritius	16.43	Proportional Representation
Japan	5.03	SNTV-Remainder	Jamaica	17.75	Proportional Representation
Greece	8.08	Proportional Representation	France	21.08	Absolute Maj.*

Source: Arend Lijphart; Demokrasi Motiferi, (çev.Güneş Ayas, Utku Umut Bulsun), Salyangoz Yayınları, İstanbul, 2006, s.161. * Başkanlık sistemleri

As can be seen on Table 1, while majority of proportional representa-

tion systems have average disproportionality scores varying between 1-5, most of the absolute majoritarian systems stand out with their disproportionality scores between 10-20. The only exceptions to low disproportionality scores of proportional representation system are Colombia, Venezuela and Costa Rica and, according to Lijphart, this is due to their presidency systems. In fact the disproportionality scores at legislative elections vary between 2.96 - 4.28 which could be considered normal results for a proportional representation system.⁴⁴

The clearest finding that appears on both tables is that at majoritarian systems disproportionality rates are high and effective numbers of parliamentary parties are low while at proportional representation systems disproportionality rates are low and effective number of parliamentary parties are relatively high.

The meaning of this is that although there may be exceptions, generally majoritarian systems lead to more disproportionate results while proportional representation systems enable more parties to be represented in the parliament.

It is thought that majoritarian systems are especially more suitable for accountability which is defined as one of the goal of electoral systems by Horowitz. This is based on the conception that ruling parties are more sensitive on the issue of giving account to electors due to power's frequent changing hands at two-party systems with simple majority principle. The reason is that the numerical majority of the ruling party on a tight rope may cause the power to be transferred to another strong party in case of unaccountability.⁴⁵ Formation of stable governments mentioned as another goal is in fact governmental stability. Usually with governmental stability, which is one of the most salient concepts on the subject of electoral systems, what is tried to be expressed is the longevity of the governments in other words them being stable. While in principle, governmental stability is a broader concept and this is usually not a product of electoral systems/election results but an output of political factors, leading one among which without any doubt is political stability.⁴⁶ As to political stability, it means maintaining institutes of political system without them being subjected to any sudden changes. Government stability is only one of many criteria of political stability therefore when mentioning a stability apart from that, existence of social order, political constitutionalism, and a lack of structural change and durability of constitution must also

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TABLE 2: EFFECTIVE NUMBERS OF ELECTION AND PARLIAMENTARY PARTIES AT 36 DEMOCRACIES

Country	Effective Number of Election Parties	Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties	Country	Effective Number of Election Parties	Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties
Holland (2012)	5.94	5.70	Spain (2011)	3.34	2.60
Denmark (2011)	5.71	5.61	Australia (2013)	4.26	3.23
Sweden (2014)	5.41	4.99	Pap.New.Guinea	-	-
Israel (2015)	7.7	6.9	England (2010)	3.71	2.57
Malta (2013)	2.05	1.97	Colombia (2014)	7.36	5.69
Austria (2013)	5.15	4.59	N. Zealand (2014)	3.27	2.96
Germany (2013)	4.8	3.5	India (2014)	6.82	3.45
Switzerland (2011)	6.35	5.57	Canada (2011)	3.43	2.41
Finland (2011)	6.47	5.83	Botswana (2014)	2.88	1.95
Belgium (2014)	9.62	7.82	Costa Rica (2014)	6.20	4.92
Italy (2014)	5.33	3.47	Trinidad (2010)	1.93	1.71
Luxembourg (2013)	4.85	3.93	Venezuela (2010)	2.19	1.97
Ireland	4.77	3.52	U.S.A.	2.14	1.96
Portugal (2011)	3.66	2.93	Bahamas (2012)	2.38	1.57
Iceland (2013)	5.83	4.42	Barbados (2013)	2.01	1.99
Norway (2013)	4.87	4.39	Mauritius (2014)	2.56	1.66
Japan (2014)	4.97	4.14	Jamaica (2011)	2.00	1.80
Greece (2015)	4.43	3.09	France (2012)	5.27	2.83

Data on the table is specific to the countries studied by Lijphart and reveals the effective numbers of election and parliamentary parties at general elections held in the relevant countries. For data see http://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/staf/michael_gallagher/EISystems/Docts/ElectionIndices.pdf

be observed.⁴⁷ As establishment of these criteria can be neither the product nor the result of solely electoral systems, instead of claiming that electoral systems have governmental stability ensuring or abolishing effects, it would be more appropriate to talk of its supporting role. Moreover, since stability must be taken as a part of both democracy

and political system, we must state, in view of the fact that stable government and stable democracy are different concepts, that stability is one of the primary indicators of an active democracy.⁴⁸

Another goal of electoral systems, victory of condorcet winners, especially comes to life at list practices at proportional representation systems. As electors are entitled to choose a candidate on the list of the parties for which they have voted at closed list, mixed list and especially preferential voting options in this system, the practice tends to reflect the preferences of the public.

In addition, proportional representation system is considered to be a system that provides better opportunities for representation of minorities in a parliament compared to majoritarian systems by facilitating accord between various religious and ethnic groups.

ELECTORAL SYSTEMS IN TURKEY: LEGAL BASIS AND PRACTICES

Legal basis of electoral systems in Turkey is the electoral law enacted in 1st Constitutional Era and enforced until 1943 elections. The parliamentarians were elected according to a two-round majority system in which the parliamentarians were first elected with simple majority and then absolute majority. Between 1946-1960, majority election by list system has been practiced.⁴⁹ No significant change on electoral system was brought by Parliamentary Election Law No. 4320 enacted on 14 December 1942, and with the law enacted on 1496 two-round electoral system was changed to single-round. The most significant feature of Parliamentary Election Law No 4918 dated 5 June 1946 was that it projected single-round elections. Open ballot was revoked and general, equal and secret ballot principle was adopted with the law amended on 1950, the elections in 1950, 1954 and 1957 was carried out accordingly and absolute majority principle was practiced. On 16 February 1950, the new Parliamentary Election Law no 5545 was enacted. The reason of this was the inability of the existing law to provide election safety. When the open ballot principle at the old law was taken into consideration, it was clear that general, equal and secret vote principle projected on the Article 1 of the Law was confined to general suffrage principle.⁵⁰ As Özbudun states, this system was creating huge rifts between the votes and representation rate thereof in the parliament and damaging representative fairness greatly. At 1950 elections, Democrat Party has taken 83.6% of the seats at the parliament with 53.4% of the votes, on the other hand The Republican People's Party has only obtained 14.4% representation rate despite receiving 39.8% of the votes.⁵¹ At 1950, 1954 and 1957 elections a majority system was practiced with

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which each party has put forward its candidates in list for each electoral district comprised of one province and all the candidates on the list of the winning party were elected.

Following the 27 May 1960 military coup, a fundamental change was brought with a new electoral law and the transition to proportional representation system took place. The main reason of the fundamental change on the system was to adopt the principle of fairness in representation. This proportional representation was practiced using “d’Hondt” method and electoral threshold was calculated by dividing number of valid votes in an electoral district by the number of seats. If no party managed to pass the threshold, then this system would be executed without one. This threshold was enforced in concurrence with d’Hondt method which partially prevents the increase of number of parties and favors relatively big parties. Adopting this method was not entirely in favor of presentation of all opinions in the parliament which is the basis of proportional representation and projected on the draft law.⁵²

First change on the adopted electoral system was brought in 1965, proportional representation system was abandoned and national remainder system was established. This system worked both in the favor of small parties and at the same time enabled the Justice Party (AP) to receive enough votes in order for it to come to power alone. D’Hondt method with threshold was reinstated in 1968 due to AP’s dissatisfaction with this system however as Supreme Court annulled electoral threshold, d’Hondt method without threshold was utilized at 1973 and 1977 elections.⁵³ Justification of annulment of the Court dated 6 May 1968 was inconsistency thereof with the Article 55 of the Constitution regarding electoral liberty.

During 12 September military regime, in order to prevent governmental crises and facilitate stability, d’Hondt method with thresholds at the level of both district and national was adopted as electoral system. This double-threshold system favored big parties and pushed smaller ones out of parliament. In fact, only three parties made it to parliament at 1983 and 1987 elections. This system provided the 1st party an absolute advantage over its competitors and harmed the principle of fairness in representation especially at 1983, 1987 and 1991 elections.⁵⁴

When we address the issue in terms of legal basis of system, the system utilized at 1983 elections were not changed so much so that it would cause disputes and objections until 1984 local elections, although there had been arguments over the regulations, they had no broad repercussions. The first acts which brought fundamental changes to the system and therefore sparked off wide public debates was the

law no 3270 dated 28 March 1986. Amendments brought by changes made on Article 38 of the Political Parties Law and and Article 38 of Parliamentary Elections Law (amendments on supplementary candidates and electoral district threshold) were close to majoritarian and the aim of benefiting big parties was directly prominent. According to Sabuncu and Şeker, this was integration of majoritarian system to threshold d'Hondt system based on Proportional representation.⁵⁵

Making regulations on electoral laws in favor of big parties has been continued with law no 3377 enacted on 23 May 1987 and the advantage thereof even has been increased. The most significant reform brought by this law is the removal of provision which preserved the majoritarian method with supplementary candidates, and projected that calculations for electoral thresholds in electoral districts where supplementary candidates are nominated would be made by taking 'number of parliamentarians to be appointed in that district minus one' as divisor, and rearranging the electoral districts which could be constituted of maximum 7 parliamentarians as 6 parliamentarians in law no 2839. With this regulation, an electoral district formerly appropriating 7 parliamentarians would be divided into two districts, and tihs would be in favor of big parties since shrinking of electoral districts would raise the electoral district thresholds.

There were also changes made on election law in advance of 29 November 1987 general elections. With law no 3403 enacted on 10 September 1987, the provision that projects the division would be made with one less in electoral districts which appoints 6 parliamentarians was reinserted, and electoral district threshold in cities which appoints 6 parliamentarians that had the lowest electoral district threshold was further increased. As a result, the lowest electoral district threshold belonging to the broadest electoral district rose from 16.6% to 20%.

20 October 1991 general elections have been held by making two new changes on the system practices in 1987. Among the changes, some regulations that may turn out to be in favor of small parties stood out. First of these was Article 7 of Law no 3757 dated 24 August 1991, in this article electoral threshold was projected as 25% for electoral districts which will appoint two or three parliamentarians and electoral districts with supplementary candidate which would appoint 4 parliamentarians and as 20% for electoral districts with supplementary candidates which would appoint five parliamentarians. The fact that thresholds were verbalized as proportional on the law text, in practice, led to the decrease of thresholds at electoral districts with 2,3 parliamentary as well as those with supplementary candidates. With the amendment

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made by the Article 10 on Article 33 of Law no 2839, electors were allowed to give preferential votes to the parliamentary candidates present on the lists of the parties (open list).

Even though the electoral districts were enlarged and levels that could produce results more closer to proportional representation compared to the former system were nearly attained with changes made on the electoral system through the Law no 4125 enacted on 27 October 1995 prior to 24 December 1995 general elections, d'Hondt method with two thresholds was virtually made a golden rule, a norm. In return, with a change made on the last provision of Article 67 of 1982 Constitution, the provision “electoral laws are organized in a manner to harmonize fairness in representation and governmental stability” was established. The Constitutional Court, not too long before 24 December general elections, annulled regulations regarding electoral district threshold on Article 16 and “national electoral district parliamentarian” on Article 8 of Law no. 4125. Fairness in representation was salient among the grounds of the Court for annulment. The 10% district threshold statement in the provision of the Law no 4138 and dated 23 November 1995 which stated thusly “All 550 members constituting TBMM will be appointed from electoral districts and the number of parliamentarians to be appointed by each district will be redetermined accordingly and district thresholds will be enforced as 10% for all electoral districts” enacted upon annulment decree has been annulled upon appeal of the President to The Constitutional Court.

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While 10% national threshold at electoral system especially operates in favor of big parties, with this threshold fairness at representation principle expressed at 1982 Constitution and electoral law as well as political freedom principle has been harmed.

With the new regulations, the practice of narrowed electoral districts (except Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir whereof number of parliamentarians to be appointed exceeded 18) which had been implemented with 1983 elections was abandoned and more holistic approach was adopted on electoral districts.

In addition, an exact proportional representation system was projected, quota practice (supplementary candidate), regional threshold and preferential system was abolished while block list practice was implemented in their place. Following the 1995 general elections, no fundamental change on electoral laws that would change the foundations of the system were made and the practice has maintained at 1999

general elections and all elections held thereafter. While 10% national threshold at electoral system especially operates in favor of big parties, with this threshold fairness at representation principle expressed

at 1982 Constitution and electoral law as well as political freedom principle has been harmed. SDP-EMEP-HADEP alliance which joined the 3 November 2002 elections under DE-HAP, DYP, MHP and Genç Parti were not entitled to be represented in the parliament despite vote rates varying between 6-9.5% This situation resulted in small parties' joining the 2007 and 2011 elections with independent candidates. Since small parties were not able to pass the electoral threshold, by supporting independent candidates in electoral districts where they were strong, they fielded 26 parliamentarians at the 2007 elections and 35 at 2011 elections, and they have overcome the unfairness of the electoral system to a degree. Despite practicing the same electoral system at 7 June 2015 elections, this time, the electors neutralized the effects of the national threshold with their preferences, in turn HDP received 12.9% vote by exceeding the threshold and managed to appoint 80 parliamentarians to the parliament.

ELECTORAL SYSTEMS' REFLECTIONS ON PARTY SYSTEMS IN TURKEY

We can examine the reflections of electoral systems practiced in Turkey on party through various indicators present on Table 3. These indicators are effective numbers of electino and parliament parties, total vote

TABLE 3: EFFECTIVE NUMBERS-DISPROPORTIONALITY RATES OF PARTIES IN 1950-1980 PERIOD

Electoral System	1950	1954	1957	1961	1965	1969	1973	1977
	Party Block Vote	Party Block Vote	Party Block Vote	d'Hondt with electoral district threshold	d'Hondt with electoral district threshold - National Remainder	d'Hondt without threshold	d'Hondt without threshold	d'Hondt without threshold
Strongest 2 Parties Vote (%)	92.1	91.4	88.5	71.5	81.6	73.9	63.1	78.3
Strongest 2 Parties Seat (%)	99.2	98.7	98.7	73.5	83.1	88.7	74.2	89.3
Effective Number of Election Parties (n)	2.3	2.4	2.6	4	2.9	3.6	4.5	3.1
Effective Number of Parliament Parties (n)	1.4	1.2	1.8	3.4	2.7	2.4	3.3	2.5
Decrease of Number of Parties (%)	39.1	50	30.8	15	6.9	33.3	26.6	19.4
Disproportionality (%)	28	32.8	16.7	1.0	0.75	7.4	5.6	5.5

and seat rates of the 2 most powerful parties in the parliament and disproportionality rate.

When the vote rates and parliament seat rates of the two most powerful parties at 1950, 1954 and 1957 elections, namely DP and CHP, are compared, it is seen that their seat rates are higher than their vote rates, and remainder representation is especially visible on DP example. This is more apparent for DP at 1954 elections. On the other hand, when effective number of parties participating at the election and effective number of parliament parties are taken into account, the tendency of the system to reduce the number of parties and favor big parties stands out. Disproportionality rates and decrease rates of number of parties indicate that this system, in each of the three elections, damaged the *fairness in representation* principle with regards to some parties partaking at the elections.

In other words, the system more or less took away the right of representation of small parties by rendering votes received by them ineffective and allowed over-representation in favor of the two big parties. When the issue is addressed in terms of proportionality/disproportionality, disproportionality which was 28% at 1950 elections have reached its peak of 32.8% in 1954 and stood at 16.7% level at 1957 elections.

Electoral systems practiced after 1960 also gave right of representation to small parties in addition to two biggest parties compared to the previous periods. In fact, the difference of 2 point between vote rates and seat rates of two biggest parties and disproportionality rate of 1961 being 1% are both indicators of this. On the other hand, the fact that decrease of the number of parties, which indicates the proportion between parties joining the elections and parties entering the parliament, remained at 15% can be interpreted as that the system did not incur large scale unfairness for relatively small parties. This can also be understood from the small difference between effective number of political parties and effective number of parliamentary parties.

When the matter is examined with the example of National Remainder system practiced at 1965 elections, the fact that the 81.6% total votes of two strongest parties, AP and CHP, corresponded to 83.1 seat rate at the parliament or disproportionality rate's being confined within a low amount of 0.75% indicates that the system does not greatly favor big parties. At the same election, effective number of electoral parties was 2.9, effective number of parliament parties was 2.7, disproportionality score was 0.75% and decrease of the number of parties was 6.9%. National remainder method has eliminated the unfairness in representation of the electoral system to a large extend. The fact that

disproportionality is confined to 0.75% is an indicator of that. In this sense, when National remainder system is compared with the picture drawn by the election results, it would be seen that this system was the one with the most benefits for small parties. Due to AP's objection to this system, which made it the come to the power alone, on grounds of protecting its power, on 20 March 1968 with Law no. 1036 d'Hondt method was reimplemented. However there was one difference, while the law projected a d'Hondt method with threshold, when the threshold practice was annulled by the Constitutional Court's verdict after it was found to be in violation of the *free elections* principle set forth at Article 55 of the Constitution, at 1973 and 1977 elections the d'Hondt method without threshold was practiced.

At 1969 elections, total of vote rates of the 2 strongest parties was 73.9%, total seats appropriated by them was 88.7%, decrease of the number of parties was 33.3%, effective number of electoral parties was 3.6, effective number of parliamentary parties was 2.4 and disproportionality was 7.4%. As it is seen, abandoning National Remainder had increased disproportionality in an instant. At 1973 elections total of vote rates of the 2 strongest parties was 63.1% while their total seats was 74.2%. There was a 26.6% decrease at the number of parties and disproportionality fell to 5.6%. The effective number of electoral parties was 4.5 and the effective number of parliamentary parties was 3.3. At 1977 elections, votes of the 2 strongest parties had increased compared to the previous election and reached 78.3%. Total seat rate of the 2 strongest parties was 89.3% which is also the highest rate after 1971. The number of parties decreased by 19.4%, disproportionality was 4.5%, effective number of electoral parties was 3.1 and effective number of parliamentary parties was 2.5. At the Table 4, indicators belonging to the elections in the period between 1983-2015 are set forth.

When findings regarding 6 November 1983 election is examined, we see that double threshold produces results closer to majoritarian system with its feature which does not allow representation of a great deal of electorates. Two strongest parties, ANAP and HP's appropriating 81.9% of seats at the parliament despite having 75.6% vote ratio had led to over-representation and damaged the principle of fairness in representation. At the same election, effective number of electoral parties was 2.8, effective number of parliamentary parties was 2.5, disproportionality score was 0.75%.

The effect of the system which is in favor of big parties and which pushes the preferences of a major portion of electors out of democratic nominal also has been felt at 1987 elections.

TABLE 4: EFFECTIVE NUMBERS AND DISPROPORTIONALITY RATES OF PARTIES SINCE 1983

Electoral System	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2002	2007	2011	2015
	d'Hondt with double threshold	d'Hondt with double threshold	d'Hondt with double threshold	d'Hondt with national threshold	d'Hondt with national threshold	d'Hondt with national threshold	d'Hondt with national threshold	d'Hondt with national threshold	d'Hondt with national threshold
Strongest 2 Parties Vote (%)	75.6	61.1	51	41	40.2	53.7	67.5	75.8	65.7
Strongest 2 Parties Seat (%)	81.9	86.9	65.2	53.2	48.1	98.3	82.3	84	70.9
Effective Number of Election Parties (n)	2.8	4	4.5	6.2	6.7	5.4	3.4	2.9	3.6
Effective Number of Parliament Parties (n)	2.5	2	3.6	4.3	4.9	3.8	2.2	2.3	3.1
Decrease of Number of Parties (%)	10.7	50	20	30.7	26.9	29.7	35.3	20.7	13.9
Disproportionality (%)	4.5	15.7	7.1	5.8	4.1	22.4	8.0	5.0	5.2

* Pre-2007 disproportionality rates used at Table 3 and 4 have been cited from the following work: Ergun Özbudun; *Türkiye’de Parti ve Seçim Sistemi*, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, NO:366, İstanbul, 2011, s.101. Post -2007 values have been calculated by us using Supreme Electoral Council and TÜİK data.

Even when only disproportionality score (15.7%) is taken into account, the fact that disproportion had reached its peak in 1987 among all elections held between 1961 and 2002 shows the extent of unfairness at representation. Decrease of number of parties’ reaching 50% makes it even clearer. The same unfairness can also be seen when considering that ANAP and SHP, 2 strongest parties, appropriated 86.9% of seats despite receiving only 61.1% of votes. A similar tendency can again be observed at fall of effective number of electoral parties, which was 4, to 2 at the effective number of parliamentary parties.

Even though limited changes prior to 1991 elections ,especially those made on electoral district threshold, was in favor of small parties, since parties other than 3 biggest ones and independent candidates could not pass the national threshold with 4,749,232 votes they received (one fifth of total votes) has turned parties towards a pursuit of alliance. While DEP joined elections through SHP lists with the thought that unfairness at representation would continue, Reformist Democracy Party,

Nationalist Task Party and Welfare Party had turned towards holy alliance and Democratic Center Party preferred to merge with DYP. The fact that 5 parties except socialist party have appointed representatives in the parliament was the evidence of that the small parties would overcome national threshold with mergers and unofficial alliances.

When we looked at the effects of the system practiced in 1991 on party system, it was apparent that the system works in favor of big parties given the fact that despite 51% vote rates of two biggest parties, they occupied 65.2% of the seats. The fact that decrease in the number of parties partaking at the elections is 20% and disproportionality is 7.1% reflects the feature of proportional representation that is made similar to majority similar to 1983 and 1987.

Despite abolishing electoral district threshold at 1995 elections, existing 10% national threshold continued to cause disproportionality and unfairness in representation. The meaning of this was that the representation fairness sought with proportional representation had been discarded. The fact that MHP and HADEP could not appropriate representatives in the parliament despite having 3,472,966 votes is the evidence of this. While the 5.8% disproportionality rate is lower compared to 1987 and 1991, it is twice as much compared to 1983. While being based on proportional representation, the fact that two biggest parties, RP and DYP, were over-represented in the parliament (41% vote versus 53.2% representation) due to high national threshold, was because of the nature of the system that leads to over-representation in favor of big parties.

Among 5 elections held between 1999 and 2015, the one where the vote rate of the strongest 2 parties were lowest (40.2%) is 1999 elections. Thereafter, total vote rates of these parties have risen incrementally up to 75.8% in 2011 and following the June 7th elections receded again and fell to 65.7%. When elections are addressed in terms of seat rates of the 2 strongest parties, 48.1% seat rate in 1999 has skyrocketed to 98.3% in 2002 due to the dominance of AK Party in the assembly. Thereafter, it has gradually decreased and fell to 70.9% in June 7th. Similarly, while active numbers of election parties (6.2) and parliament parties (4.9) were highest during 1999 elections among those between 1983-2015, they receded to 3.6 and 3.1 respectively at June 7th elections. If we assess this trend together with decreasing number of parties and disproportionality level, the elections where both were high is the one in 2002. At this election when AK Parti were represented with a high majority in the parliament and only 2 parties were present in legislative body, number of parties has decreased by 29.7% and disproportionality rate has been 22.4%. This situation has been due to the fact

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that only 2 parties managed to enter the parliament and the effects of high national threshold on the picture is quite influential. The fact that DYP, MHP, Genç Parti, Kurdish political movement have not been able to appropriate seats in the parliament despite their vote rates of, respectively, 9.5%, 8.4%, 7.3% and 6.2% is explanatory of the situation. 2002 elections can be considered as a typical example of the extent of the effects of a high threshold at a proportional representation on unfairness in representation in a country.

Although decrease of number of parties has (35.3%) increased in 2007, independent candidanship of especially Kurdish political movement representatives have caused the disproportionality rate to recede to 8%. While decrease of number of parties have receded to 20.7% at 2011 elections and 13.9% at the last elections, and similarly proportionality sails around 5-5.2%. The trend of disproportionality rate to fall since 2011 is closely related to entrance of Kurdish political movement to the parliament with independent candidates and thus ignore the effects of national threshold.

The strategic alliance that the electors made with HDP in order for this party to pass the threshold on June 7th is meaningful in terms of how the threshold which was designed as an authoritarian electoral engineering project was demolished with the will of the electors.

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In order to see to what extent the threshold method of proportional representation used at elections in 1983-2015 period is responsible for the reflection of election performances of parties to the parliament, vote and seat rates of parties which entered the parliament and vote they needed to appoint 1 member of parliament can be examined.

The first thing that stands out on Table 5 is that; the threshold practice implemented on proportional representation by 12 September government to establish political stability served the single party majorities at 1983, 1987, 2002 and 2007 elections to appear as a manufactured majority (the strongest party's obtaining the majority of seats in the parliament despite not being able to get the majority of the votes). As for 2011 elections, the fact that AK Party obtained 59.3% of the seats in the parliament with 49.8% votes is considered for it to have come very close to earned majority.⁵⁶ The existence of manufactured majorities are natural however it is related to unfair reflection of votes of other parties in the parliament. The data on the table indicates that the relation between the

TABLE 5: VOTE AND SEAT RATES OF PARTIES IN 1983-2015 PERIOD AND VOTE AMOUNTS THEY RECEIVED TO APPROPRIATE ONE SEAT

	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2002	2007	2011	2015
ANAP	45.1 (52.9) 37123	36.3 (64.9) 29809	24.0 (25.6) 44413	19.7 (24.0) 41873	13.2 (15.6) 47941	5.1 (0)	-	-	-
HP	30.5 (29.3) 45177	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
MDP	23.3 (17.8) 56858	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
SHP	-	24.7 (22.0) 59909	20.8 (19.6) 57574	-	-	-	-	-	-
DYP/DP	-	19.1 (13.1) 77746	27.0 (39.6) 37082	19.2 (24.5) 39970	12.0 (15.5) 44063	9.5 (0)	5.4 (0)	0.7 (0)	0.1 (0)
RP/FP	-	7.2 (0)	16.9 (13.8) 66473	21.4 (28.7) 38053	15.4 (20.2) 43291	-	-	-	-
DSP	-	8.5 (0)	10.8 (1.6) 374900	14.6 (13.8) 54184	22.2 (24.7) 50879	1.2 (0)	0.0 (0)	0.3 (0)	0.1 (0)
MHP	-	2.9 (0)	-	8.2 (0)	18.0 (23.5) 43461	8.4 (0)	14.3 (12.7) 70448	13.0 (9.6)	16.2 (14.5) 94000
CHP	-	-	-	10.7 (8.9) 61450	8.7 (0)	19.4 (32.4) 34344	20.9 (20.4) 65337	26.0 (24.5) 82636	24.9 (24) 87258
HADEP	-	-	-	4.2 (0)	4.7 (0)				
AK Party	-	-	-	-	-	34.3 (66.0) 29774	46.6 (62.0) 47880	49.8 (59.3) 65440	40.8 (46.9) 73129
Saadet	-	-	-	-	-	2.5 (0)	2.3 (0)	1.2 (0)	2.0 (0)
DEHAP/ Ind./ HDP	-	-	-	-	-	6.2 (0)	5.2 (4.0) 70595	6.6 (6.5) 80569	13.1 (14.5) 75731
GENÇ Party	-	-	-	-	-	7.3 (0)	3.0 (0)	-	-

vote rates and seat rates of parties are in favor of big parties so much that it would not require a statistical analysis to comprehend so. The main reason of such a result is the threshold practices implemented in the electoral systems. The fact that the ANAP, winner of 1983 and 1987 elections, appropriated respectively 52.9% and 64.9% seat rates with 45.1% and 3.6% vote rates cannot be explained otherwise. In a similar fashion, AK Party which received 34.3%, 46.6%, 49.8% votes in respectively 2002, 2007 and 2011 to appropriate 66%, 62% and 59.3% seat rates respectively is also explanatory of to what extent does the system results over-representation in favor of big parties. It is also possible to see this tendency by looking at the vote rates parties need in order to appropriate one Member of Parliament.

According to our calculation, the vote amounts the winner parties need at elections to appropriate 1 Member of Parliament is fewer compared to the other parties. While electoral districts and electoral geography of parties are also effective on this, it is clear that the main determinant thereof is the electoral systems. While ANAP, the winner of 1983 elections, appropriated 1 Member of Parliament with 37,123 votes, the votes required for the same by the third party of the election, MDP, was 56,858. The fact that DYP, the winner of 1991 elections, appropriated 1 Member of Parliament with 37,082 votes against appropriation of 1 Member of Parliament with 374,900 votes by DSP which managed to enter the parliament with 10.8% is a typical example of electoral system based distortion of vote and seat performance between parties. While in 2007 AK Parti appropriated 1 member with 47,800 votes, the votes required by CHP was 65,337. The picture has remained unchanged at elections on June 7th. While AK Parti, MHP and CHP appropriated 1 Member of Parliament with respectively 73,129, 94,000 and 87,258, the minimum votes required for independent candidates to be elected was 75,731. This picture confirms, once again, that proportional representation is not quite fair and representational in terms of fairness in representation.

When the matter is assessed in more broad sense, it is clear that electoral systems adopted after 1980 force electors to make a choice between two different political regimes. Of these choices *"the first is the parliament that has been appropriated with an election based on stable, strong legislation and has a threshold, which tries to overcome ethnic and religious issues with electoral system and the government thereof. As to the second one, it is a political regime where small parties take turns and no single party can manage to come to power alone, which is governed by unstable coalitions and full of violence-terror".*⁵⁷ Despite all experiences, there has never been a compromise between parties in terms of democratization of electoral system and bringing it a representative nature, nor

does it seem like there will be one in the future, even at a minimum level. Yet, it will not be possible to make the democracy settled unless values and stability is brought to electoral laws and they are institutionalized. Approach of parties to electoral systems are set forth below.

SUGGESTIONS REGARDING ELECTORAL SYSTEMS BY PARTIES

Alternative electoral system suggestions have been made by primarily political parties in addition to NGOs and academic circles to change the electoral system that is the fruit of 12 September regime,. Here, the suggestions that has been reflected on the public will be primarily addressed. When the electoral system of AK Parti is considered, a picture similar to the following appears at the discussions in the last year: In the democratization package announced by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the Prime Minister of 30 September 2013 period, especially 10% national threshold enforced at general elections and fairness in representation-governmental stability was brought into question with tangible examples ⁵⁸

Utterance of issues regarding the current electoral system in both the reports prepared by the Wise People Committee in addition to European Union progress reports, criticisms voiced against the system from nearly all strata were the main source of motivation for alternative suggestions proposed by AK Party with regards to a change in the system. At the vision document consisting of 63 articles presented by AK Party at its 4th Grand Ordinary Congress it was stated that there would be fundamental changes on electoral system, ⁵⁹ however details of which were not disclosed. In “the 2023 Political Vision document”, starting from the proposition of “Turkey requires efficient and strong government structures in order to resolve the problems it faces today and deal with risks, actualize its regional and global claims”, a discussion was started on governmental systems without mentioning an election system suggestion with the aim of ridding the strong and stable government from periodicity and institutionalize it.⁶⁰ With the said democratization package, AK Party had made three different electoral system suggestions in the said period and has declared that it is ready to reach consensus on any one of these. These three system suggestions were respectively; to maintain the current system, to adopt an electoral system with narrowed district with groups of 5 to be enforced with 5% national threshold and a single member district electoral system that would be practiced without a national threshold. Following these propositions, Turkey has gone through the 3 elections consecutively and discussions focused on electoral systems gave way to mainly discussions on governmental system and discussions on absolute thresh-

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old. The sliding of the focus of the discussions was also reflected on the election bulletins of the parties and electoral system discussions were not addressed with holistic approach except in certain areas of expression. While the electoral system discussion were ongoing, Erdoğan has noted, at a statement he made to the press, that studies were being made on single-member district electoral system without threshold and that this system could be adopted.⁶¹ In return, AK Party's General Vice President in charge of electoral affairs at the time Mustafa Şentop remarked that there are problems on the matter of fairness in representation between provinces and that in some electoral districts the electors are not familiar with candidates and at the time they were not doing any works on threshold however works regarding narrowed districts.⁶² Mustafa Elitaş, the Group Deputy Chairman of AK Party in office at the time, stated that threshold is of vital importance to the governmental stability and expressed that while they currently do not have any endeavors on threshold as the party however he thought that the most correct system for him was the narrowed electoral district since it constituted a threshold within itself.⁶³ It must be stated that while these theses were being discoursed, the matter that was dwelt on persistently was the idea that single-party government is necessary for stability and both electoral threshold in addition to electoral system needed to be established accordingly. We should state that the criticism of AK Party towards the electoral system was present before they came to power, we can further say that the source of alternative electoral system mentioned by Mustafa Şentop was based on the legislative proposal submitted by Vecdi Gönül on July 27th, 2002.

With this proposal of which justification was that more than 20 members were elected in some districts and electors could never get familiar with the candidates and electees; it was projected to limit the number of members to be appropriated by each district to maximum 6, to consider provinces with number of members up to 6 electoral districts, to divide the provinces with 7 to 12 members to 2 districts, with 13 to 18 members to 3, with 19 to 24 members to 4, with 25 to 30 with 5 districts, and to increase the number of electoral districts in Istanbul which appropriates 87 parliament members from 3 to 13, to increase the number of electoral districts in Ankara which appropriates 32 parliament members from 2 to 6 and to increase the number of electoral districts in Izmir which appropriates 26 parliament members from 2 to 5.⁶⁴

While AK Party had not proposed a model with this approach towards electoral system, relatively the most orderly approach is present in 2023 Political Vision Document. In the said document, abolishment of legislative regulations that constitute a problem with regards

to electoral system and elections, abolishment of bans with regards to right to elect and be elected, and especially strengthening the fairness in representation was set as goals, and hence it was expressed that there would be changes on all laws including the Constitution, Law no: 298 on Basic Provisions on Elections and Voter Registers, Political Parties Law no: 2820, and Representatives Election Law no: 2839. In addition, it was also noted that legislative regulations will be implemented in order to ensure maximum level of democratic representation, to improve the democratic standards, to familiarize the public with representatives, abolish all anti-democratic obstructions and restrictions in front of the right to elect and be elected as well as to facilitate the opportunity of the people to get know the electees better and get in contact with them.⁶⁵

When the election declaration drawn up by AK Party prior to the 7 June 2015 general elections is examined, it is seen that the focal point is presidential system while the issue of electoral system is not addressed in a holistic manner. No expressions related to electoral threshold were encountered. Even though with the new libertarian and human-focused constitution, the goal to establish a political system where elections can generate stability, legislative and executive powers are effective per se, democratic balance and control mechanisms are projected, political representation of social differences are ensured, a decentralized administrative system is strengthened, resolution processes are accelerated, all kinds of tutelage is prevented; this goal was associated closely with a new governmental system (Presidential System) and no discussion were made with regards to electoral system.⁶⁶ The issue of electoral system was vaguely addressed by claiming that it would be renewed as a whole together with laws on elections, political parties and all other laws in the constitution.⁶⁷

When the suggestions and approach of elites of CHP towards the electoral system reflected on the public is reviewed, it can be said, just as the CHP leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu said, that they find the 10% electoral threshold too high and they are in consensus on the lowering of this rate.⁶⁸ Narrowed district electoral system is not seen as a correct system as it would pull the electoral threshold on province basis higher.⁶⁹ According to General Vice President of CHP of the period Faruk Loğoğlu, single-member electoral system is an “expanded dictatorship”.⁷⁰ This consensus observed at the level of opinions of CHP that are reflected on the public, indicates, as comments of some parliamentarians also indicate, some differences within the party. . For example; while former Konya parliamentarian Atilla Kart declared that while he supported the abolishment of threshold altogether, CHP wished a 5%

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threshold.⁷¹ Another difference that can be interpreted as a reflection of the conflict within the party, can be observed on the party manifesto of CHP and the election bulletin drawn up for June 7 2015 general elections. While on the party manifesto it is stated that ‘the 10 percent threshold will be lowered’, on the election bulleting it was stated the election threshold would not pass 5 percent. In the democracy report published by CHP in 2011, it is stated that the final goal of those defending the 10 percent threshold is a government where a single party holds the power and that this promises oppression rather than stability.⁷² In the same report, it was stated that the electoral threshold would be maximum 5%, the most basic solution is in the parliament again, and covering the differences and issues in Turkey through electoral and political system engineering would be prevented by increasing the representative ability and authority of the parliament.⁷³

With regards to Electoral Law, CHP party manifesto includes the objectives of correction of mistakes on the legal regulations made in order to allow expat citizens to vote at the elections held in Turkey in the country they reside ⁷⁴ and lowering of 10% threshold.⁷⁵ In June 7th election bulletin titled ‘A Turkey to be Lived in’, the following was proposed as solution to the defined issues; (1) promotion of political majoritarianism in the parliament by lowering the election threshold which is a remnant of the military coup,⁷⁶ (2) CHP would not allow rights and liberties to become matters of negotiations for an authoritarian presidency system, (3) therefore, first of all, the electoral threshold would be lowered.⁷⁷ It was promised in the bulletin that anti-democratic laws remaining from September 12th elections, particularly electoral laws and political parties law, would be changed, and threshold at general elections would be no more than 5%. The promise of formation of electoral districts abroad in order for issues of expat citizens to be voiced in the TBMM and that they would be made to be represented by 10 parliamentarians in TBMM, which meant that one representative would be appropriated for every 300 hundred voters in the bulletin was also interesting with regards to the issue at hand.⁷⁸

The bill that entails lowering of 10% electoral threshold to 5% after June 7th elections, proposed by CHP Istanbul Parliamentarian Akif Hamzaçebi to TBMM, is the most recent development regarding the matter. The expression “electoral system that would enable reflection of particularly the different opinions in the public on the parliament in the broadest manner” present in the justification of the bill which projects changes on the Parliamentary Election Law is especially interesting. According to the bill, 10% threshold causes the national will to not be reflected completely on the parliament, and some electors feel

obliged to change their preferences due to the threshold. According to the expression in the bill, “In 2015 general elections, 10% electoral threshold has been abolished virtually by the nation. Results of the election noticeably revealed that national will is against the 10% threshold and the electoral threshold must be lowered⁷⁹. The bill proposed by Hamzaçebi is particularly important in the sense that it is one of the most tangible proposals of CHP regarding the issue.

The stance of MHP -which has been present in TBMM continuously since 2007, disputed whether it would remain below the threshold prior to 2011 general elections, and which has a well-known approach towards Kurdish political movement- against the electoral system is also worth noting. MHP has worked on a solution suggestion regarding the electoral threshold and increasing the representation capacity, and this study was covered in press.⁸⁰ According to this suggestion, MHP opposes preferential voting and single-member system. The reason why they object to these practices were that preferential voting would sap the strength of parties and make it difficult for parties to enforce discipline while single-member could incite ethnic and religious differences. According to MHP leader Bahçeli, single-member system could stir up ethnic discrimination and mafia and would reinforce political patronage, clientalism, nepotism and regionalism links.⁸¹ According to him, narrowed districts are more preferable compared to single-member districts. Because, single-member district is an extension of Erdoğan’s longing of dictatorship.⁸² Lowering the threshold was opposed on the grounds that it would result in political instability, a divided political picture and a stance in favor of keeping the threshold at 10 percent was assumed. In addition to the reasons stated here, the fact that the threshold, ‘as is’, is a systemic requirement that obstructs the representation of Kurdish political movement in the Parliament can also be a reason that reinforces MHP’s position. While defending the current threshold, at the same time, MHP proposes a practice where parties below the threshold would be appropriated between 50 to 100 seats and would be represented in the parliament with a number of parliamentarians in direct proportion to their vote rates however could not form groups. In the manifesto of MHP published on 8 November 2009 titled “Toward the Future”, MHP considers finding a balance between fairness in representation and governmental stability principles with electoral systems and considers it necessary to establish electoral laws by taking both of these principles into account.⁸³

MHP doesn’t have any other expressions in its manifesto regarding the issue except the proposals of change on electoral laws voiced in company with a set of quite ambiguous and generic principles. It also expressed

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at the electoral notice it presented to the public with the title, “Social Restoration and Peaceful Future” for 7 June 2015 General Elections, that voting would be procured to be made with “electronic voting” method and this method would be practiced at the nearest elections. Within this scope, it promised that a national software would be developed in place of SEÇSIS software and electoral system would be made secure.⁸⁴ It is seen that, except for the proposition regarding the software aspect of elections, MHP focuses more on the funding of politics related to elections in this notice instead of the electoral system.

How HDP approaches the electoral system discussions is important as the Kurdish political movement faces the risk of threshold at every election. When the stance of HDP regarding this matter is addressed, in addition to its focus on height of the threshold, and rather than its proposal of a holistic electoral system, emphasis on a proportional system that is surprisingly closed becomes salient. Ertuğrul Kürkçü, the co-president of HPD at the time, has taken a stance against the single-member and narrowed district electoral systems, in a manner that could be described as reactive, by claiming as a reason that systems with high thresholds as opposed to low ones were systems from which AKP benefited directly, and that they serve the goal of AKP -to create a constitution by itself- by confining HDP in the east, and CHP in coastlands while eliminating MHP completely.⁸⁵ He advocated for lowering of threshold to 3 percent in the existing system as a solution. Similarly, in the discussions that HDP joined in public environments, elites of the party have focused on lowering or abolishing the threshold.⁸⁶ From this point of view and statement included in the party manifest and electoral notice prepared before 7 June 2015 elections, it can be deduced that HDP wishes a proportional representation system without threshold.

In the electoral notice of HDP titled “Us to the Parliament!” for 7 June elections, detailed adjustments involving matters from democratization of Political Parties to internal structure of parties were included and it was expressed that the electoral threshold would be abolished and the way for all parties to be represented in the Parliament in proportion to their votes would be paved.⁸⁷ In the party manifesto, the matter of electoral system is conjoined with the content for political parties and election laws to ensure that national will would arise without limitations or thresholds.⁸⁸ These expressions are quite important as they provide an insight to the stance of HDP in the electoral system discussions in the recent period. In the final analysis, it would not be exaggerated to say that electoral system proposals were overshadowed by the discussions regarding the governmental structure of Turkey.⁸⁹

ELECTORAL SYSTEM SUGGESTIONS OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND ACADEMIC CIRCLES

Alternative electoral system proposals for Turkey have always been on the agenda of non-governmental organizations and academic circles as much as they have for parties, and various system proposals were developed. In the analysis titled “Toward June 7th Comparison of Electoral Declarations of AK Party - CHP - MHP- HDP” of Institute of Strategic Thinking addressing the electoral declarations of political parties in the parliament in a comparative manner, it is claimed that single-member district system is more defensible for representative capacity of HDP. It is remarkable that it is thought HDP has only touched proportional representation briefly in its electoral notice by taking the votes that can be received from the west in terms of general politics of HDP.⁹⁰

Özbüdü is of the opinion that while single-member district is a democratic system, it is not fair and that this system is not suitable for Turkey. According to Özbüdü, while single-member district system is unsuitable as it is exposed to the influence of influential systems in a region such as communities, religious orders, landowners and as electees in such a system would focus on local issues rather than national ones; narrowed district system is unsuitable as it is in favor of big parties. The main grounds of which is that in a narrowed district, a threshold is essential by the nature of electoral system. For example, if five parliamentarians are to be appointed in a district, those with less than five percent of votes in this district would be get caught in the threshold. MHP would be the one that would suffer most from a narrowed district system. In such systems, as the districts narrow, the advantage of big parties increases, thus such a system would be in favor of AK Party the most.⁹¹ The author projects that an electoral system change that is to be implemented could only be viable by staying within the confines of proportional representation, and thus only a limited change may be implemented. Lowering the national threshold brings about a political challenge and one way for eliminating the unfairness caused by high national threshold would be to keep a national threshold however exempt winning parties or parties with vote rates higher than a certain amount from national threshold in some districts as practiced in some countries such as Germany, Sweden and Denmark.⁹²

In the report Erol Tuncer has written for TESAV, effects/reflections of electoral systems were stated to be: a) effects on the voting behaviour of electors b) effects on the vote rates of parties outside TBMM c) effects on system of political parties d) possible relation with government models e) relation with political power f) effects on political process and as the solution suggestion, it was claimed that search for a

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new electoral system is unnecessary, the most suitable solution would be to keep the current system while lowering the national threshold to five percent.⁹³

In the report titled “Numerical Analyses and Policy Recommendations for Improvement of Existing Electoral System” prepared for TE-PAV, Türkmen Göksel and Yetkin Çınar have presented their policy recommendations on how to change what factors in order for the system to be rendered fairer without hindering the stability.

In the report, after the facts that there were differences between vote and seat rates of parties, there is imbalance between their seat rates and their power in the parliament, and these variations are born out of various factors were established by reviewing the past elections and through measurements and analyses, it was expressed that systematic inequality would be eliminated -at least to a certain extent- by changing the sizes of electoral districts and electoral threshold properly. According to the authors, maintaining a high threshold disrupts “qualitative fairness” in addition to “quantitative fairness”, and elections in Turkey appear weaker in terms of fairness in representation compared to those in Europe. Propositions put forward as solution suggestions are; a) To lower electoral threshold to 4 % or less b) to establish a fairer method for parliamentary appropriation in regional scale and to lower the threshold.⁹⁴

In the report titled ‘New Electoral System Suggestion for Turkey-Analysis of Alternative Electoral Systems Under the Light of Representation, Legitimacy and Coalition Issues’ prepared by Seyfetting Gürsel, it was stated that three main flaws of the current D’hondt proportional election system with high threshold were its tendency to generate unfairness in representation, weakness of legitimacy and unstable coalition governments. Secondary flaws such as unequal representation of cities in the parliament, disconnection between electors and parliamentarians and that some electors are forced to vote strategically instead of for their first choices can be added to these three main flaws.⁹⁵ In the same report, it was expressed that developing a new electoral system which could eliminate the flaws of the current system to an agreeable degree and thus can be agreed upon relatively easier is possible, and the main elements of such a system was listed as follows: 1) Zero threshold 2) Number of Members of Parliament 600 3) Narrowing electoral district which are to appropriate 500 members collectively to 6 members each 4) Granting double voting right to electors.⁹⁶ Gürsel thinks that the matter of concern in case the threshold is abolished would be that the system would be divided to extreme and cause serious governmental

issues. It is possible to eliminate this risk by narrowing electoral district in a drastic scale. If the largest electoral districts were limited to 6 members of parliament, the size of an average electoral district would equal 3-4. D'Hondt system practiced under these conditions would favor the winning party more however at the same time it would provide the opposition with representation close to its vote rate. Also, the favor for the winning party would not be at the degree that would allow the winning party to attain majority with vote rates that are far less than 40 percent as it does in the existing system as the threshold is removed. Primary reason of which is that, particularly the "Kurdish" party, and all parties having regional vote concentrations would attain the seats that they are entitled to. Election simulations show that, similar to the situation with systems where threshold is lowered to 5 percent, vote rate that would result in a single-party government with a narrowed district system with zero threshold is at least between 38-40 percent.

In return, the winning party which exceeds 40 percent vote rate could come to power alone. Which is positive in terms of governmental stability.⁹⁷ According to the author, if Turkey continues to perform parliamentary elections with the current system in the future, that would mean a serious outrage of fairness in representation as well as continuation of the risk to generate legitimacy problems. Pulling the risks to the minimum can neither be possible with a change that lowers 10 percent threshold nor a practice where current system is preserved and only 100 parliamentarians are elected without being subjected to national threshold. The means to reduce the risks significantly is to implement an electoral system where 50 parliamentarians out of 600 are appointed throughout the nation with a proportional method without threshold, the remaining 550 parliamentarians are appointed through narrowed electoral districts with existing D'Hondt method but without threshold and the elector is granted double vote rights.⁹⁸ "In case each elector is granted two voting rights, it is possible to increase the capacity of fairness in representation of the system further. Double vote right would also result in electors, who would be free of the worry of using their votes strategically, to reflect their first choices more realistically".⁹⁹ This electoral system is a mixed system where in a parliament with 600 seats, 100 or 50 parliamentarians are appointed throughout the country with an exact proportional method without threshold, and the remainder are appointed in single-member districts with two-round majoritarian system, which is also called "Proportionally Reinforced Two-Round Single-Member District Electoral System". With zero threshold in this system, while representation issue in East and South-East is solved completely, establishment of an extremely

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divided parliamentary is averted thanks to narrowed electoral districts. As to representation of smaller parties, this is ensured due to 50 seats to be allocated via proportional method throughout the country. A party which receives about 2 percent vote will be able to attain at least one parliamentarian. Gürsel calls this system, “Narrowed District Mixed System with Zero Threshold”.¹⁰⁰

According to Gürsel, instead of D'Hondt counting method, Hare quota formula which is the closes formula to proportional representation can also be adopted. However, then the dividing effect of such a change on political system must be taken into account.¹⁰¹ The author indicates that if no fundamental changes are to be made on the two-round single-member electoral system, then the most appropriate design would be a system where electoral threshold is abolished completely and electoral districts are narrowed so that this would not cause division. In this system, it is shown that Kurdish party (parties) representation issue unique to Turkey is solved completely, and at the same time as the vote rate for single party rises significantly, it is pretty much ensures that legitimacy issue do not arise again as it did following 2002 elections.¹⁰²

In the report drawn up by Legist Kübra Toksarı for TASAM, it is claimed that an electoral system required for Turkey is due to three basic needs.

These are; 1- In case parliamentary system or semi-presidential system is chosen, establishment of a strong government with a single party would be ensured, and in case presidential system is chosen, it would enable the party of the president to attain majority in the parliament, 2- It would lay the foundation for establishment of a main opposition party stronger compared to the other oppositions parties and 3- It allows representation of smaller parties in the parliament by keeping national electoral threshold at a symbolic level.¹⁰³ In line with these needs, according to Toksarı, “two-round, two-list electoral system” contains all three qualities. According to the proposed system, elections would be held in two-round regardless of the situation. In other words, contrary to standard two-round electoral system, second round election is held regardless of the result of the first one. Numbers of parliamentarians to be appointed with first and second round are the same. For example, if 500 parliamentarians are to be appointed in total, 275 would be chosen in first round and 275 would be chosen in the second. This also means that half of the parliamentarians to be elected in an electoral district would be made so in first round and the other half would be made so in the second round. All political parties with enough qualities to join the election joins the first round. As to the second round, only two parties with most votes would join it. In addition, in order to prevent

parties to join the elections in second round with joint lists or at least prevent hidden negotiations, parties will have the obligation to submit the candidate lists they will put forth in first and second rounds before the first round at the same time to the Supreme Electoral Council. It is also mandatory for lists to be different from each other. In this sense, the possibility of political parties to nominate same candidates is eliminated. Likewise, it is also mandatory for the candidates in both lists of each political party to be different from each other. According to the author, in the first round national threshold is kept at 1% and a proportional representation electoral system is practiced (d'Hondt method). Two parties with the highest number of votes join the second round. The party which received the highest number of votes is considered to be the winner of both the second round and the election.¹⁰⁴

In the report prepared by Prof İlhan Kaya on behalf of International Cultural Research Center, three electoral system suggestions were projected for Turkey. These are; a) If the current proportional representation electoral system is going to be maintained, to not have more than 5% electoral threshold, further, to abolish practice of electoral threshold for parties founded by minority ethnic, religious and cultural groups b) If electoral system is going to be changed, to practice single-member two round absolute majority system with zero threshold and therefore enable electors to vote for their secondary choices in case their first choices are not elected, c) to follow two different processes to determine parliamentarians. To appropriate a part of parliamentarians without being subjected to any threshold practice, by being elected according to the vote rates their party receives and for second part to be appropriated with a single member electoral district system.

Thus, by forming a close interaction between electors and candidates, representation of different fractions in the parliament is enabled. According to Kaya who thinks unfairness in representation could be eliminated to a significant degree by implementing a mixed electoral system and threshold practice, the issue of threshold should be addressed together with intra-party democracy, candidate selection processes and participatory democracy concepts.¹⁰⁵

CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS

Since a multiple party political party was established in Turkey, discussions focused on electoral systems occupy the agenda of the public. These discussions are mostly on the reflection of vote strength of political parties on the parliament. Since majority system practiced in 1950-1960 period caused over-representation in terms of seat distri-

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bution of parties in the parliament and thus paved the way for unfairness in representation, the proportional representation system was implemented with 1961 elections. While it was assumed that, with this method, unfairness in representation would be prevented on one hand and stable governments would be formed on the other, impact of the change on socio-economic structure that took place in 70s and reflection of new social divisions on party system have been the evidence of that politics cannot be made inclusive solely via mechanical changes on the electoral system. Especially from the second half of 70s, fractured structure of party system caused by this change, and consequent unstable governments, provided the conditions of 12 September coup in an unmanageable system.

Military elites counted political establishment, uncompromising attitude of political elites, parties and electoral system among the dynamics that lead Turkey to 12 September, this caused politics to be rebuilt through foreign powers and lead to seeing party system and electoral system as lifesavers during this construction period. Thus, adopted electoral system was utilized to reform a new politics and community with the designed party system. Party system was tried to be made into a two-party system with electoral district and national thresholds, and foundation for this were tried to be laid with 1982 Constitution and political parties and electoral laws. Even though the single party order made dominant by 12 September through Constitution and laws operated without causing significant problems until the early 1990s, it can be said that it has contributed to placing Turkey democracy on an exclusivist road thanks to its results against fairness in representation brought in particular by two threshold electoral system. Entrance of pre-12 September political actors to the politics with the lifting of pre-1987 political bans has hastened the downfall of two-party system tried to be established through double-threshold in 1991 elections. In a sense, threshold practice made dominant for the sake of governmental stability has started to crumble in the face of political waves coming from deep within society. While fraction formed on the Turkey's party system with 1991 elections and volatile nature of elector choices could not be prevented despite double threshold electoral system, it was natural for number of parties in the parliament to increase which lead to governmental instabilities.

It must be stressed that governmental instability in this period was neither the direct output of electoral system nor the democracy that started to become salient and could not administer. Because, electoral system designed by 12 September was in force so that there would be no governmental instability and at the same time DYP and SHP, repre-

TABLE 6: INDICATORS REGARDING FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATION AND GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY AT ELECTIONS IN 1983-2015 PERIOD

Fairness in Representation	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2002	2007	2011	2015
Number of parties participating at the election	3	7+Ind.	6+Ind.	12+Ind.	20+Ind.	18+Ind.	14+Ind.	15+Ind.	20+Ind.
Number of parties represented in the parliament	3	3	5	5	5+Ind.	2+Ind.	3+Ind.	3	4
Total Number of Valid Votes	17351510	23971629	24416666	28126993	31184496	31528783	35049691	42941763	46163243
Represented Votes (n)	17155922	19222397	24275576	24064848	25470245	17235832	30482454	40960484	43964045
Represented Votes (%)	98.9	80.1	99.4	85.5	81.6	54.6	86.9	95.3	95.2
Non-Represented Votes (n)	195588	4749232	141090	4062145	5714251	14292951	4567237	1981279	2199198
Non-Represented Votes (%)	1.1	19.9	0.6	14.5	18.4	45.4	13.1	4.7	4.8
Number of Government	1	3	4	4	1	2	1	1	1
Type of Government	Single Party 1. Özal Government (13.12.1983-21.12.1987)	Single Party II. Özal Government (21.12.1987-09.11.1989) Akbulut Government (09.11.1989-23.06.1991) 1. Yılmaz Government (23.06.1991-20.11.1991)	Coalition-Minority VII. Demirel Government (21.11.1991-25.06.1993) 1. Çiller Government (25.06.1993-05.10.1995) II. Çiller Government (05.10.1995-30.10.1995) III. Çiller Government (30.10.1995-06.03.1996)	Koalisyon-Azınlık II. Yılmaz Government (06.03.1996-28.06.1996) Erbakan Government (28.06.1996-30.06.1997) III. Yılmaz Government (30.06.1997-11.01.1999) IV. Ecevit Government (11.01.1999-28.05.1999)	Coalition V Ecevit Government (28.05.1999-18.11.2002)	Single Party Gül Government (18.11.2002-14.03.2003) Erdoğan Government (14.03.2003-29.08.2007)	Single Party II. Erdoğan Government (29.08.2007-06.072011)	Single Party III. Erdoğan Government (06.07.2011-29 August 2014) Davutoğlu Government (29 August 2014-7 June 2015)	
Government Term (Day)	1469	689 591 150	543 832 25 128	114 367 560 137	1271	106 1625	1407	1148 284	
Government Term (Average)	1469	476	382	294	1271	865	1407	716	

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sentatives of AP and CHP tradition which had been sides of past political polarization, have come together in a coalition government that could be exemplified for social consensus. The problem was not a technical detail such as electoral system, but our system of values related to democracy inherent in our political culture. Since 1991, during the period of fractured party system that lasted 11 years, coalitions had been easily formed with consensus of elites however were not long-lived.

Roles of the coalition parties in the democracy that could not rule has costed them dearly in the end, representation and legitimacy crises experienced by parties from all corners of ideological map has brought a new political party to power by itself in Turkey on 3 November 2002. Of course, the impact of 10 percent national threshold was significant on coming of AK Party to power. In the elections DYP, MHP and DEHAP had been left outside the parliament with 6-9 percent votes and this caused AK Party to form the single-party government through over-representation. However, attributing the achievement of AK Party to have come to power solely to the electoral system would lead us to ignore the fact that center right and left parties could not manage to respond to the socio-economic change in the country. High threshold practice in all elections from 2002 to 2015 has left AK Party unchallenged in our party system, and while it evolved the dominant party, the magic in favor of this party was dispelled on 7 June despite high threshold. Inability of 13 year AK Party government to extend the

democratization of democracy beyond dissolution of military wardenship, then again its discriminative practices which lead to regime being made more authoritarian and turned into a hybrid regime, have resulted in the termination of AK Party's single-party government through strategic alliance of the electors. The meaning of 7 June elections with regards to our subject is that; the electors comprehended the fact that high threshold blocks such as 10% not present in western democracies could not be abolished by politicians and thus they abolished themselves -at least in functionality- by carrying HDP to the parliament. We can examine the data set forth on Table 6 to better grasp the political process we try to convey above.

In 1983-2015 period, 3 to 20 political parties and independent candidates joined the 9 general elections, however only 3 to 5 of these parties and independents managed to attain seats in the parliament. Number of parties partaking at the election was at its highest in

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Inability of 13 year AK Party government to extend the democratization of democracy beyond dissolution of military wardenship, then again its discriminative practices which lead to regime being made more authoritarian and turned into a hybrid regime, have resulted in the termination of AK Party's single-party government through strategic alliance of the elec

1999 and 2015 elections (20 parties+independent candidates), highest number of parliamentary parties (5) was achieved in 1991 and 1995 elections. Even though 20 parties and independents have partaken at 7 June elections, number of parties managing to enter the parliament was 4. On June 7th, as the parties that were left outside the parliament had vote rates ranging between 2% and 0,01%, 10 percent threshold had no direct effect on failure of these parties to attain seats in the parliament. However, it was confirmed in post-election public surveys that high threshold had a psychological effect on elector choices, which they elected for a party other than their own so the party they loathed would not receive high votes, in other words they made a strategic voting. It should not be overlooked that it would be very challenging for parties which received no more than 2% of the votes to appropriate representatives in the parliament with a system with a threshold as low as 5%.

One of the most significant indicators on the table is the height of unrepresented votes which we think are the result of 10% national threshold in particular. In the period we review there are 141.090 (0,6%) to 14.292.951 (45,4%) unrepresented votes and this is the most typical indicator that projects the unfairness in representation of the electoral system. At 7 June elections, number of unrepresented votes were 2.199.198 and this number is 4.8% of the total votes.

When the matter is approached within the frame of governmental stability, in the 2 periods when unrepresented votes were at their highest (1987-1991 period, 3 single party governments, average government life 476 days, unrepresented vote rate 19,9%), (2002-2007 period, 2 single party governments, average government life 865 days, unrepresented vote rate 45,4%) single party governments were in the office. There are also coalition government that took the office following the elections with high number of unrepresented votes. What's more, the government life is quite long. As a matter of fact, V. Ecevit government formed during DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition following 1999 elections has held the office for 1271 days. Just as these data do not indicate that d'Hondt method with 10% national threshold would absolutely establish a stable single party government (4 Party structure generated in June 7th elections), they also do not indicate that coalition governments would be formed under conditions when the number of unrepresented votes are low. A typical example regarding this issue is formation of single-party government by AK Party despite unrepresented vote rate in 2011 elections were 4,7%. While the picture drawn by the data on the table indicates that the impact of electoral threshold on establishment of fairness in representation is significant, it also indicates that govern-

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mental stability in terms of government life cannot be solely the output of elections.

At this point, it must be said that an electoral system for Turkey that would ensure fairness in representation and governmental stability in cooperation cannot be designed easily. However, this statement should not be interpreted as that current system with national threshold can be maintained.

In our opinion, a system which would harbor fairness in representation and governmental stability even at the minimum level is the leading one among the essentials for democracy in Turkey to attain an inclusive and

pluralist quality. Steps that would be taken towards this can be, as Özbudun states, making limited changes within the confines of proportional representation without attempting a radical change on electoral system.¹⁰⁶ 7 June election results is the messenger of the start of a new elector positioning in Turkey, and that party system would operate in the grip of 4 parties in the following short and mid term period. Just as the “strategy to combine four tendencies” artificially constructed by ANAP in 1980s and based on keeping different tendencies which operated together for a time artificially together had collapsed in early 1990s, Turkish, nationalist, conservative, Kurdish electorate of AK Party which it kept bound to itself for last 10 years started to abandon this party. In this sense, 7 June

In our opinion, a system which would harbor fairness in representation and governmental stability even at the minimum level is the leading one among the essentials for democracy in Turkey to attain an inclusive and pluralist quality.

elections can be interpreted as the first step of dissolution of AK Party in medium term. It does not seem likely for the said electorate to return to AK Party completely in the coming period and carry it to power in the parliament with great majority. However, returning of a limited portion of electorate that had turned to MHP and HDP, to AK Party as confirmed by the public surveys conducted following the election, can give AK Party the power again in the first election. In case this return involves a big portion of the electorate, AK Party can attain majority in the parliament due to national threshold. As over-representation of AK Party would mean increasing unfairness in representation, a change on electoral system is necessary. Here, the important point is not which party is the strongest, but the fact that the threshold always poses a risk of presenting manufactured majorities to the biggest parties.

ALTERNATIVE ELECTORAL SYSTEM SUGGESTIONS FOR TURKEY

The first and most important that must be taken towards electoral system change is to lower 10 percent national threshold to 5 percent. In addition, as Özbudun proposes, appointing 100 members of parliament free of national electoral district with a proportional representation system without threshold can help establishment of a more pluralist and multi-opinion parliament. Özbudun thinks that in case national threshold is not lowered, then the system practiced in some countries such as Germany, Sweden and Denmark -which entails exempting parties which came in first at certain electoral districts or passed certain vote rates from national threshold practice- can be practiced, and this would eliminate unfairness in representation without harming governmental stability.¹⁰⁷

We think that the fairness in representation would be reinforced if parties which could not appropriate seats in the parliament even though the national threshold was lowered to 5 percent, however ranked first in certain district or districts were allowed to appropriate seats through a d'Hondt method but by being exempted from electoral thresholds in those certain districts and if seat allocation were recalculated accordingly for all parties in those districts. For example, in case 100 members of a parliament consisting of 450 members presumptively are appointed via proportional representation d'Hondt method and remaining 350 members are appointed via proportional representation d'Hondt method with 5 percent national threshold, the calculation may be made by subtracting the total number of parliamentarians to be appointed by

SIMULATION 1:

If seat distribution of 100 members on 7 June was made with proportional representation d'Hondt method without threshold from national electoral district and the rest 450 members were distributed with the same method however with 5% national threshold;

PARTIES	Distribution of 100 mp with P.R. d'Hondt w/o Threshold (n)	Distribution of 450 mp with P.R. d'Hondt w/ 5% national Threshold (n)	TOTAL MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT (n)
AK PARTY	42	193	235
CHP	26	118	144
MHP	16	77	93
HDP	13	62	75
Saadet P.	2	-	2
INDEPENDENT	1	-	1

electoral districts where the winner would be exempted from threshold from number of parliamentarians subjected to threshold (350), and by distributing the remainder number of parliamentarians to parties based on their vote rates.

In addition, making unofficial election alliances between parties which we consider to be attempts to virtually pierce anti-democratic threshold practice enforced since 1991 elections free with an amendment on electoral law would serve the democratization of the system and right to elect. In the simulations below, it is shown what kind of seat allocation would be encountered with the alternative electoral systems we propose by being inspired from Özbudun.

If this system were to be practiced, AK Party, CHP, MHP, HDP, SP and Independents would have appointed respectively 42, 26, 16, 13, 2 and 1 of 100 parliamentarians. As to the appointment of 450 parliamentarians with 5% threshold, allocation would have been as follows:

AK Party, CHP, MHP and HDP would obtain respectively 193, 118, 77 and 62 out of 450 seats. In such a setting, total number of members of parliament of parties would be: AK Party:235, CHP: 144, MHP: 93, HDP: 75, SP: 2, Ind: 1.

If electoral districts were arranged in a balanced manner prior to June 7th, distribution through the system with 10% threshold would be: AK Party: 236, CHP: 144, MHP: 94, HDP: 76

PARTIES	Distribution of 550 mp with P.R. d'Hondt w/ 5% national Threshold (n)
AK Party	236
CHP	144
MHP	94
HDP	76

While A Party takes 45 of the 100 seats, and 169 of 350 seats, B Party takes 31 of the 100 seats, and 118 of 350 seats, C Party takes 17 of the 100 seats, and 63 of 350 seats, D Party 4 of the 100 seats, E Party 2 of the 100 seats and F Party 1 of the 100 seats, G and H parties cannot appropriate any seats.

In case this system is practiced while A Party appropriates: 217, B Par-

SIMULATION 2:

Distribution of seats if parties are appropriated seats according to the votes they receive in the general elections in a system where 100 members of a 450 member parliament are appointed free from national electoral district, remaining 350 members are appointed with proportional representation d'Hondt method with 5% national threshold:

PARTIES Valid Votes (45.400.000)	Distribution of 100 mp with P.R. d'Hondt w/o Threshold (n)	Distribution of 350 mp with P.R. d'Hondt w/ 5% national Threshold (n)	TOTAL MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT (n)
A PARTY (20.000.000)	45	169	214
B PARTY 14.000.000	31	118	149
C PARTY 7.500.000	17	63	80
D PARTY 1.900.000	4	-	4
E PARTY 1.000.000	2	-	2
F PARTY 500.000	1	-	1
G PARTY 400.000	-	-	-
H PARTY 100.000	-	-	-

ty: 152, C Party: 81 seats, none of the other parties could appoint any parliamentarians.

As can be seen on the table above, while A Party takes 45 of the 100 seats, and 162 of the 335 seats and 5 of the 15 seats; B Party takes 31 of the 100 seats, and 113 of 350 seat and 2 of 15 seats; C Party takes 17 of the 100 seats, and 60 of 350 seats and 1 of 15 seats; D Party 4 of the 100 seats and 1 of 15 seats; E Party 2 of the 100 seats 4 of 15 seats; and F Party 1 of the 100 seats and 2 of 15 seats; G and H parties cannot appropriate any seats according to this simulation.

The common aspect of the simulations is that regardless of the electoral system, none of the vote rates we have presumptively inputted are enough for any of the parties partaking at elections to come to power alone. At the simulation no 3 with proportional representation d'Hondt method with a threshold as low as 5%, only 3 parties are able to enter the parliament.

On the contrary, at the simulation no 2 where 100 members of a 450 member parliament were appointed through electoral district without

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SIMULATION 3:

Distribution of seats if parties are appropriated seats according to the votes they receive in the general elections in a system where all members seats of 450 seat parliament are appropriated with proportional representation d'Hondt method with 5% national threshold:

PARTIES	Distribution of 450 mp with P.R. d'Hondt w/ 5% national Threshold (n)
A PARTY	217
B PARTY	152
C PARTY	81
D PARTY	-
E PARTY	-
F PARTY	-
G PARTY	-
H PARTY	-

threshold, and remaining 350 members were appointed through proportional representation d'Hondt method with 5% national threshold, at the end of an election which is joined by 8 parties, D, E and F parties enter the parliament through their parliamentarians elected in national electoral district and thus number of parties in the parliament increases to 6.

At the simulation no 4 where 100 members of a 450 member parliament are appointed from national electoral district with proportional representation d'Hondt without threshold, and remaining 350 members are appointed with proportional representation d'Hondt with 5% national threshold and where parties are exempted from threshold in cities where they rank 1st (For example: In a system where there are 50 electoral districts in total, E Party comes in first in a district that appoints 10 parliamentarians, and F Party comes in first in a district that appoints 5 parliamentarians), there are no new parties that manages to appoint members into the parliament. However, even though E and F parties fail to pass the national threshold, their position as the 1st party in their electoral districts bring these two parties additional parliamentarians, and it is enabled for the vote preferences in the districts where they are strong to be reflected on the parliament in addition to the share they get from the 100 members. If in these electoral districts, ethnic based voting preferences are more salient, then the system would

SIMULATION 4:

Distribution of seats if parties are appropriated seats according to their votes in general elections in a system where 100 members of a 450 member parliament are appointed from national electoral district with proportional representation d'Hondt without threshold, and remaining 350 members are appointed with proportional representation d'Hondt with 5% national threshold and where parties are exempted from threshold in cities where they rank 1st (For example: In a system where there are 50 electoral districts in total, E Party comes in first in a district that appoints 10 parliamentarians, and F Party comes in first in a district that appoints 5 parliamentarians):

PARTIES Valid Votes: 45,400,000	Distribution of 100 mp with P.R. d'Hondt w/o Threshold (n)	Distribution of 335 mp with P.R. d'Hondt w/ 5% national Threshold (n)	Distribution of 15 mp in cities where parties (E,F) below threshold came in first	DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT (n)
A PARTY	45	162	3+2	212
B PARTY	31	113	2	146
C PARTY	17	60	1	78
D PARTY	4	-	1	5
E PARTY	2	-	4	6
F PARTY	1	-	2	3
G PARTY	-	-	-	-
H PARTY	-	-	-	-

be more inclusive in terms of fairness in representation and democratic legitimacy as it reflects the preferences in the parliament.

We are of the opinion that the system presented in simulation no 4 is required to be discussed by our parliament consisting of 550 seats, during the activities of the New Parliament which we hope they would conduct with regards to electoral system. In our opinion, while preferential voting system which has come to the fore recently is important in terms of reflecting electors' will on the parliament, increasing competition and quality¹⁰⁸, it would not be enough.

The thin Turkey needs after the 7 June elections is not the exclusivist democracy concept of the recent years, but instead construction of an inclusive democratic system where political liberties are utilized more effectively. Beginning such an endeavor by improving the system in terms of fairness in representation can be one of the biggest contributions to the democracy which is one of the political assurance of free-

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dom. It must also be noted that any adjustments to be implemented with regards to electoral system should only be considered a starting point on the road of reinforcing democracy, and existing political parties law should also be addressed with a liberal perspective to expand political freedom areas. In particular, a mandatory pre-election for a certain rate of candidates to be enforced by a law related to nomination of parliamentary candidates can lead to the weakening of oligarchic party structures that do not democratize their internal affairs and leader hegemonies during process and pave the way for democratic processes to strengthen.

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