From Editor-in-Chief
Apart from the problem of escaping the economic crisis, which has been overwhelming everyone, mainly due to inflation, two issues have dominated the political agenda in recent weeks: early elections and constitutional amendments.
It is not hard to understand why early elections have remained on the agenda for almost a year. In the general parliamentary elections held in May 2023, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) emerged as the leading party, while the Justice and Development Party (AKP) fell to second place. This outcome, rather than alarming the AKP and MHP, seems to have excited the main opposition party, which has long yearned for power. For this reason, CHP leader Özgür Özel has been persistently voicing his call for “early elections” for quite some time. Just a few days ago, Özel even mentioned a date for these elections: November 2025.
In reality, the CHP leader’s insistence on early elections might not stem from his certainty that such an election would bring his party to power alone but rather from his concern that a delay might erode the public support currently in favour of his party. And there is a possibility that his concern may prove valid. Additionally, Özel’s eagerness for an immediate election is likely influenced by the uncertainty of what “rabbit Erdoğan might pull out of his hat” if the election is delayed further.
It should not be expected that President Erdoğan, representing the senior partner of the ruling coalition, will immediately respond positively—or even at all—to the CHP leader’s call. One reason for this is that Erdoğan has long considered it necessary to ignore such calls from the opposition, except when they happen to align with his and his party’s political calculations. This approach allows him to maintain his grip on political initiative and ensures that he remains the primary determinant of the political agenda. The second reason is that Erdoğan and his partner currently have another issue on their agenda: constitutional amendments. For some time now, President Erdoğan has been calling on the opposition for a “new constitution.”
Thus, it is unlikely that Erdoğan will respond to the CHP leader’s call for early elections before achieving some tangible progress on the issue of constitutional change or finding conditions suitable for a strategy that combines both matters. Moreover, forming a definitive stance on this issue will depend on whether Erdoğan decides to run as a candidate in a potential presidential election.
It should not be expected that President Erdoğan, representing the main partner of the ruling coalition, will immediately respond positively—or even respond at all—to this call made by the CHP leader. One reason for this is that, unless by coincidence it aligns with his and his party’s political calculations, Erdoğan has long considered ignoring such calls from the opposition as essential to maintaining his political initiative and ensuring that he remains the primary determiner of the political agenda.
The second reason is that another issue, constitutional amendments, is currently on the agenda of Erdoğan and his coalition partner. For some time now, President Erdoğan has been calling on the opposition for a ‘new constitution.’ Therefore, it is unlikely that Erdoğan would immediately respond to the CHP leader’s call for early elections without first achieving tangible progress on the constitutional amendment issue or seeing the conditions as favourable for a strategy that could combine both matters. Moreover, for Erdoğan to make a definitive decision in this regard, it also depends on whether he decides to run as a candidate in a potential presidential election.
When it comes to the ‘new constitution’ issue, it is hard to believe that a ruling bloc that does not even fully adhere to the requirements of their own 2017 constitutional revision is genuinely seeking a constitution that truly limits political power and safeguards fundamental rights. More importantly, as if it were not enough that the AKP-MHP government has made elections that violate fair competition in politics a routine in Turkey, they persistently disregard universal norms such as human rights, the rule of law, and the independence and impartiality of the judiciary, which are essential guarantees of citizens’ freedoms. Therefore, no positive outcome can be expected from the People’s Alliance, which has made ignoring the Constitution a habit for nearly a decade, in their attempt to draft a new constitution.
Even if the ruling parties’ efforts were sincere and genuine, there is no guarantee that they would adhere to the proper path and methods required for democratic constitution-making. This issue is far more complex and deeper than Erdoğan’s rhetoric of ‘reaching consensus with all parties’ suggests. Meanwhile, it is also a mistake for the CHP to focus solely on the ‘unchangeable provisions’ of the Constitution in this matter. This issue is more complicated and profound than the CHP assumes and requires separate consideration. The fundamental misfortune in Turkey’s constitutional amendment process, especially regarding the ‘new constitution,’ is this: while the CHP is categorically opposed to a substantial revision of the Constitution, the AKP, which seems in favour of such a change, is pursuing a move that is fundamentally anti-constitutional.
Even if the ruling parties’ efforts were sincere and genuine, there is no guarantee that they would adhere to the proper path and methods required for democratic constitution-making. This issue is far more complex and deeper than Erdoğan’s rhetoric of ‘reaching consensus with all parties’ suggests. Meanwhile, it is also a mistake for the CHP to focus solely on the ‘unchangeable provisions’ of the Constitution in this matter. This issue is more complicated and profound than the CHP assumes and requires separate consideration. The fundamental misfortune in Turkey’s constitutional amendment process, especially regarding the ‘new constitution,’ is this: while the CHP is categorically opposed to a substantial revision of the Constitution, the AKP, which seems in favour of such a change, is pursuing a move that is fundamentally anti-constitutional.
Another issue on our agenda, which has almost become routine in recent years, is the increasing prominence of religious references and displays of religiosity in public life. Indeed, the religious tone dominating the public discourse of AKP members, especially President Tayyip Erdoğan, has been a subject of debate on numerous occasions. These religious references sometimes manifest as portraying the President as a distinguished religious leader, sometimes as using religious concepts and symbols to gain political advantage, and sometimes even as presenting Turkey as a religious state rather than a secular republic. The current problem is that, while we have grown accustomed to politicians, primarily from the AKP, using religion for political purposes, a similar religious rhetoric has now unexpectedly emerged from a different source: the high judiciary.
Earlier this month, during the ceremony for the swearing-in of the newly appointed member of the Constitutional Court, the Court’s President delivered a speech that, on the one hand, adopted a security-state perspective, advising judiciary members to fulfil their duties in adherence to national law, while on the other, prominently featured religious themes. As described by a devout conservative journalist, this speech resembled a ‘Friday sermon,’ containing numerous references to Quranic verses, justifying the call for justice through a religious rationale, and even emphasizing the necessity for judiciary members to uphold justice with the fear of punishment in the afterlife. The President also addressed judges and prosecutors as ‘my brothers and sisters.
However, grounding public duties in religious requirements and norms is not only contrary to the secular character of the Republic of Turkey but also incompatible with the state’s ideological neutrality. In a pluralistic civil society, the state cannot base its legitimacy on the beliefs and values of one group of citizens—regardless of whether that group constitutes the majority of the population. Furthermore, in a republic, it is inappropriate for public officials to address their colleagues and citizens as ‘my brothers and sisters.’ Citizens are not the ‘brothers’ of public officials in any sense. Even when acting in an official capacity, a public official’s own biological brother is nothing more than a fellow citizen.
This is because a republic is not a brotherhood or an organization in a religious or communitarian sense; it is a political union of citizens whose status in relation to the state is defined by law. Those who should be most aware of this and adhere to it are, above all, judges.
Finally, I would like to touch upon the results of a recent study that reveals the extent of public trust in state institutions. The most striking result of the survey conducted by the research and consultancy company ASAL in August is that the percentage of citizens who do not trust any state institution is quite high (18%), almost at the same level as the trust in the military, which is considered the most trusted institution (19%). This outcome indicates that the state in Turkey is facing a severe erosion of legitimacy. In my opinion, this is a situation that Turkey’s political elites and ‘state elites’ should take as an alarm.
The same applies to the extremely low level of trust in the judiciary, which stands at only 1.4%. It is clear that these dismal results, particularly the pessimistic outcome regarding the judiciary, are largely the result of the AKP-MHP government’s actions. In fact, it must be said that the incredibly low trust in the judiciary is an even more alarming finding than the first. Because even if other state institutions are on the verge of collapse, a well-functioning legal and justice system can still hold society together. In other words, while the other findings are mainly about the ‘state’s’ ability to sustain itself, this second finding poses an existential threat to ‘society’ in Turkey—it is about the ability to survive as a ‘society.’ Where law and justice do not function, not only the state but the very existence of society itself is at risk.
In this issue of Freedom Observer, A. Rıza Çoban assesses the meaning and potential consequences of Turkey’s legislative, executive, and judiciary bodies’ continued disregard for European Court of Human Rights decisions. Ö. Faruk Şen addresses the recent scandal involving the theft of personal data belonging to 108 million people, including migrants and foreign residents in Turkey. Additionally, Caner Gerek evaluates the high demand for protectionism in foreign trade among citizens in the Freedom Research Association’s liberal values survey and examines the relationship between protectionism and unemployment.
See you in the next issue of Freedom Observer.
* Prof. Dr. Mustafa Erdoğan
The European Court of Human Rights and Turkey
Although Turkey became a party to the European Convention on Human Rights in 1954, it only recognized the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), the Convention’s protective body, in 1989. Since then, the ECHR has become the last resort for those in Turkey who believe their rights have been violated and seek justice. From the late 1990s onwards, a significant portion of the Court’s caseload has consisted of applications from Turkey. As of August 31, 2024, out of 65,050 pending applications before the Court, 24,200 (37.2%) are against Turkey.[1] Additionally, out of the total 22,676 violation judgments issued by the Court between its inception in 1959 and the end of 2023, 3,530 were against Turkey. Meanwhile, Turkey has accepted a friendly settlement in 222 applications.
It takes approximately five years for the ECHR to issue an average decision. Despite this, the ECHR still represents a beacon of hope for Turkish citizens. Looking at the statistics of the past three years, 9,548 applications in 2021, 12,551 in 2022, and 8,341 in 2023 were submitted to a judicial formation against Turkey.[2] These numbers reflect applications that have been reviewed by the Court’s registry and allocated to a judicial formation, not the total number of applications sent from Turkey, which is much higher. Additionally, as of the end of 2023, 16,874 applications against Turkey have been assigned to either the Committee or the Chamber for examination, meaning there is a very high probability of violation judgments in these cases.
However, it appears that Turkey has not made any effort in the last decade to improve its human rights record, prevent violations, or reduce the number of applications. On the contrary, all institutions, including the legislature, executive, and judiciary, seem to have a common stance of ignoring the violation judgments issued by the ECHR and failing to fulfil their requirements. Despite the ECHR’s judgments on violations of Article 18, which prohibits the misuse of the power to restrict fundamental rights, it is well known that Kavala and Demirtaş have not been released for years. However, non-compliance with ECHR judgments is not limited to this. No steps have been taken for a long time on dozens of issues identified as structural problems by the ECHR that require legal and judicial solutions. For instance, no action has been taken for decades regarding the problems of conscientious objectors, the inability of a married woman to use her maiden name alone, structural issues related to the right to assembly and demonstration, the issue of impunity, and the problems of Alevis concerning places of worship and compulsory religious education.[3] According to the data from the Department for the Execution of Judgments of the Committee of Ministers, which is responsible for monitoring the implementation of ECHR judgments, there are 142 pending leading cases against Turkey related to structural problems.
For example, in the Vedat Şorli judgment of 2021, the ECHR found that the provision of the Turkish Penal Code, which criminalizes insulting the President and prescribes a prison sentence of one to four years, was incompatible with the Convention and ruled that a legislative amendment was necessary to address this systemic issue.[4] Since then, the Committee of Ministers has been demanding the abolition of Article 299 from the government. However, neither the legislative body has taken any steps in this direction, nor have the judicial bodies adhered to the clear provision of Article 90 of the Constitution, which stipulates that provisions conflicting with international agreements shall not be applied. Following the Vedat Şorli judgment, the Constitutional Court has not issued a single substantive decision on applications related to insulting the President. Each year, tens of thousands of investigations are initiated for this offence, and the Ministry of Justice continues to grant permission for prosecution in such cases.
In its 2023 judgment in the case of Yüksel Yalçınkaya, the Grand Chamber of the ECHR ruled that Article 7 of the Convention, which sets out the principle of no punishment without law, had been violated and pointed out that this issue indicated a systemic problem in terrorism trials. The Court emphasized, within the framework of Article 46 of the Convention, that this judgment must be implemented in similar cases. However, not a single court has referenced this judgment in the past year. During the retrial hearing held on September 12, 2024, the Kayseri 2nd High Criminal Court refused to comply with the ECHR judgment and again sentenced the applicant, Yalçınkaya, to the same punishment.[5] A country that consistently ignores ECHR judgments cannot remain a member of the Council of Europe in the long term. If the government’s intention is to exit from Council membership, it is clear that this will not be in the best interest of the country or its citizens. In the speech made by the President of the Court of Cassation during the new judicial year opening ceremony, emphasis on national law clearly implied that universal legal principles and international legal institutions would not be considered. It should be kept in mind that a national law that disregards universal legal principles promises lawlessness, insecurity, and poverty for citizens.
* Doç. Dr. Ali Rıza Çoban – Constitutional Lawyer
Allegation of Turkey’s Largest Data Leak
Turkey has been shaken by one of the largest data breaches in recent years. According to Web of Turkey, the personal data of 108 million individuals registered with official institutions, including their identity numbers, addresses, and phone numbers, have been stolen. The hackers stored this stolen data in five different Google Drive files, causing widespread public concern. This breach not only affects Turkish citizens but also foreigners and migrants with residence permits in Turkey. Web of Turkey claimed that, following the incident, the Information and Communication Technologies Authority (BTK) requested Google’s assistance due to the failure to protect the data.[6]
The Minister of Transport and Infrastructure, Abdülkadir Uraloğlu, stated that this data breach occurred during the Covid-19 pandemic. Uraloğlu admitted, ‘It is true that some information was unfortunately obtained in a certain manner during that period. Unfortunately, it could not be prevented,’ thereby acknowledging the state’s shortcomings in data security once again. While questions about the extent and nature of this leak during the pandemic remain unanswered, no satisfactory responses have been provided regarding these new allegations.
Cybersecurity experts are warning about the long-term impacts of such a data breach, according to cybercrime expert Assoc. Prof. Dr Salih Bıçakçı, the state’s lack of transparency and failure to take necessary measures to secure the data deeply undermines the perception of digital security in Turkey. Bıçakçı emphasizes that storing data without encryption is a major mistake, and such negligence could pave the way for significant fraud cases.[7]
It remains uncertain how effective legal and political efforts to hold those responsible for the breach of personal data security will be. The Media and Law Studies Association (MLSA) has brought the case of the theft of 108 million individuals’ data to the Constitutional Court. It is worth noting that last year, MLSA also filed a lawsuit against the Ministry of Interior regarding data theft. After the case was dismissed in December 2023 on the grounds that ‘although the data was stolen, the administration bears no responsibility,’ MLSA appealed to the Constitutional Court in June 2024. Claiming that this negligence by the administration violated citizens’ right to privacy, freedom of expression, and the right to a fair trial, MLSA’s application to the Court will be closely monitored. Regarding this latest development, DEM Party’s Izmir MP İbrahim Akın highlighted in a parliamentary question that the National Cyber Incident Response Center (USOM) failed to take adequate precautions to prevent this situation and did not fulfil its duty to secure the data.[8] However, we remain sceptical that this inquiry will prompt the administration to acknowledge its responsibility and transparently share these developments with the public.
This is not the first time we have encountered data theft. In 2016, another major scandal involving the theft of 50 million individuals’ data came to light.[9] Since then, it is evident that serious reforms in digital security have not been implemented. The new data leak, which Minister Uraloğlu claims occurred during the pandemic, indicates that the state’s cybersecurity infrastructure still has weaknesses and that the government has not taken sufficient steps to protect digital rights.
The protection of personal data is a critical issue that concerns not only individual privacy but also societal security. This recent data breach serves as yet another reminder of the urgent need for reforms to protect digital rights in Turkey.
* Dr. Ömer Faruk Şen– Missouri University
Import Protectionism and Unemployment
The Freedom Research Association has published its research titled ‘Liberal Values in Turkey 2024.’ While the study aims to understand people’s perspectives on liberal values in Turkey, the results reveal a negative outlook on the free market. One of the key areas where this negative view is evident is the demand for protectionism in foreign trade. A significant 66.68% of participants agreed with the statement, ‘Imports hinder the development of domestic industry and create unemployment; therefore, they should be restricted,’ thus expressing a preference for protectionism and the belief that imports impede industrial development and lead to unemployment.
This widespread belief, not unique to Turkey, generally stems from the idea that countries striving for self-sufficiency are essential for achieving a better standard of living. Although not explicitly asked in this study, it is very likely that protectionists view exports positively, thereby desiring a one-sided relationship with foreign markets. However, such a relationship is neither feasible nor capable of improving living standards. As economist Paul Krugman noted, ‘The plain truth is that every successful example of economic development this past century — every instance of a poor nation that worked its way up to a more or less decent, or at least significantly better, standard of living — has taken place via globalization; that is, by producing for the world market rather than trying for self-sufficiency.’ .[10]Therefore, in today’s world, the demand for a protectionist stance is incompatible with the goal of raising living standards. Preventing unemployment through protectionism, on the other hand, requires a more nuanced approach.
As Turkey develops, a shift from the manufacturing industry to the services sector is taking place. Although there are debates about the appropriate timing of this transition, the economy is increasingly becoming more service-oriented. With the help of recent technological advancements, the growing share of service exports globally will accelerate this shift even further. While manufacturing still holds a certain weight in this process, services will increasingly take a larger share alongside manufacturing. In the past, employment in the manufacturing sector created a ‘multiplier effect’ for other manufacturing jobs, but this effect is now shifting more toward the services sector. Within the supply chain, manufacturing has become the sector producing the least added value. According to renowned economist Raghuram Rajan, competition emerging within the supply chain results in the ‘smile curve.’ The added value is quite high in the early service segments of the supply chain, where many contributions, including R&D and design, occur. In the middle segment of the supply chain lies actual production, where Turkey struggles to move beyond but finds support to remain. In this phase, the added value decreases. The final service segment includes branding, marketing, and sales, where added value rises again, forming the ‘smile curve.’ For these reasons, implementing protectionist policies to preserve employment in the manufacturing sector hinders the country’s progress in raising its welfare level.
Employment Issue
Contrary to common belief, economic decisions do not always benefit or harm society equally. In fact, economic decisions create winners and losers, and public authorities often determine who gains and who loses through their choices. The beneficiaries and those adversely affected can shift over time. Where there is change, it’s crucial to be prepared for the risks that change brings. A protectionist approach, akin to a job guarantee, implies the continuous protection of a specific group, which contradicts the dynamic nature of economies. Even if free trade might lead to short-term job losses in certain sectors, the economy’s evolving structure and the purchasing power brought by imports contribute to employment growth in other sectors.
Thus, the notion that protectionism prevents unemployment is flawed in the long term. The dynamism of economies is built on the principles of development, movement, and adaptation, rather than on static preservation. Otherwise, preserving employment for a particular group would come at a cost to all other citizens. As renowned economist Vilfredo Pareto noted, trade protections benefit a concentrated minority—particularly in terms of employment—while the costs are borne by a much wider segment of society. However, since the visible effect in economics is the short-term job loss of this concentrated minority, there often exists a broad base of support for protectionism.
* Dr. Caner Gerek
1 https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr/stats-pending-month-2024-bil
2 https://www.echr.coe.int/statistical-reports
3 Toplantı ve gösteri yürüyüşüne ilişkin 05.12.2006 tarihli Oya Ataman kararı (no. 74552/01); Cumhurbaşkanına hakarete ilişkin 26.6.2007 tarihli Artun ve Güvener kararı (no. 75510/01); Vicdani redde ilişkin 24.01.2006 tarihli Ülke kararı (39437/98); yaşam hakkına ilişkin 03.06.2004 tarihli Batı ve Diğerleri kararı (33097/96). Evli kadının soyadına ilişkin 16.11.2004 tarihli Ünal Tekeli, Zorunlu din derslerine ilişkin 16.09.2014 tarihli Mansur Yalçın kararı, Cem evlerinin hukuki statüsüne ilişkin 26.04.2016 tarihli İzzettin Doğan ve diğerleri kararı uygulanmayı bekleyen kararlardan bazılarını oluşturmaktadır.
4 Vedat Şorli/Türkiye, no. no. 42084/19, 19.10.2021.
5 https://www.dha.com.tr/gundem/aihmin-ihlal-karari-verdigi-feto-davasinda-yerel-mahkemeden-yine-ayni-karar-2504026
6 https://www.freewebturkey.com/108-milyon-yurttasin-tum-kisisel-verileri-calindi-btk-verileri-koruyamadigini-kabul-ederek-google-dan-yardim-istedi
7 https://medyascope.tv/2024/09/12/siber-guvenlik-uzmanina-sorduk-85-milyon-kisinin-verilerinin-calinmasi-ne-anlama-geliyor/
8 https://www.mlsaturkey.com/tr/mlsa-100-milyonu-askin-kisinin-verisinin-calindigi-skandali-aymye-tasidi
9 https://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/turkiyeden-50-milyon-kisinin-kimlik-bilgileri-calindi-510149
10 Paul Krugman, “Enemies of the WTO,” Slate, November 24, 1999.
