From Editor – in- Chef
As Turkey approaches local government elections in three and a half months, the contours of inter-party collaboration become increasingly evident. Recent developments indicate a continuation of the alliance between the ruling coalition partners, AKP and MHP, mirroring their collaboration in the preceding general elections in May. Notably, it has been disclosed that the factions constituting the People’s Alliance will field a unified candidate across 30 metropolitan cities for the upcoming local elections. Accordingly, the MHP candidate will receive backing in Mersin and Manisa, while the AKP candidate will be endorsed in the remaining metropolitan areas.
Meanwhile, the AKP’s proposition—hinting that refraining from trustee appointments could be considered if the Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (HEDEP/DEM) nominated a candidate in Istanbul—aimed to dissuade potential Kurdish voter support for the CHP. However, it appears that this proposal has not been embraced by the intended recipient. In fact, the most recent reports indicate that HEDEP/DEM has opted for collaboration with the CHP in the elections.
On a different note, following IYI Party leader Meral Akşener’s expression of regret regarding her prior collaboration with the CHP in the “Nation Alliance” during the last May elections, the CHP appears to have intensified its endeavors in nominating candidates for the upcoming local elections. In fact, the CHP has unveiled its mayoral candidates for over 200 electoral districts. Meanwhile, the candidacies of Ekrem İmamoğlu for the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality and Mansur Yavaş for the Ankara Metropolitan Municipality have been confirmed.
Certainly, Turkey’s focus extends beyond the local election developments. Numerous ongoing issues, both longstanding and recent, persist in occupying the country’s attention, with some exhibiting partial positivity, yet the majority showcasing no visible signs of amelioration. Among the more heartening occurrences was the recent favorable communication from the European Union, serving as a gesture of goodwill. The conclusive statement stemming from the EU General Affairs Council’s final session of 2023 in Brussels conveyed that the EU “remains a pivotal partner across various areas of mutual concern.” Additionally, Turkey’s standing as a candidate country was reiterated in the statement.
The statement further articulated a “commitment to sustain an honest and open dialogue with Turkey, tackling shared challenges, and collaborating on crucial areas of mutual interest such as migration, climate, counter-terrorism, and regional matters.” Nevertheless, as highlighted by EU Commissioner for Enlargement Oliver Varhelyi, reinvigorating the accession process demands Turkey’s pursuit of a “constructive agenda” that would herald a fresh phase in relations, particularly marked by advancements in the realm of the rule of law.
It seems there’s been a series of somewhat optimistic remarks from key figures in the recent economic leadership. Minister of Economy and Finance Mehmet Şimşek’s announcement of “positive outcomes” arising from the new policies being implemented and the anticipation of a decrease in inflation by the middle of the upcoming year, was succeeded by Central Bank Governor H. Gaye Erkan’s commitment to attaining price stability, effectively meaning a reduction in inflation. Our colleague Enes Özkan is offering a comprehensive evaluation of the economic developments below.
The recommendations from the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) concerning the prevention of corruption among parliamentarians, judges, and prosecutors have sadly received scant attention from Turkey. Regrettably, the upcoming “reform” plans reportedly on the government’s docket lack proposals aligned with GRECO recommendations. This absence of improvement isn’t unexpected, given the current government’s reputation for apathy toward corruption prevention and its apparent reluctance to establish a transparent and accountable system. A. Rıza Çoban delves into the specifics of this issue below.
Here’s hoping that the forthcoming Freedom Observer will be brimming with news of developments that usher in hope and optimism for the approaching new year.
* Mustafa Erdoğan
GRECO Publishes 4th Compliance Report on Turkey
On December 7, 2023, the Council of Europe’s “Group of States against Corruption” (GRECO) published its fourth interim compliance report on Turkey’s compliance with its recommendations within the scope of its Fourth Phase Assessments on the prevention of corruption in parliamentarians and judges and prosecutors.(1) GRECO adopted this Report on Turkey during its 69th General Assembly on October 16, 2015, and released it to the public on March 17, 2016, with Turkey’s authorization.(2) The Report encompassed a total of 22 recommendations, comprising seven for parliamentarians and 15 for judges and prosecutors. Previous interim compliance reports have been issued to evaluate the adherence to these recommendations. The fourth interim compliance report concluded that there had been no significant progress in comparison to the preceding reports. Consequently, Turkey has satisfactorily addressed or fulfilled three out of the twenty-two recommendations detailed in the Fourth Round Evaluation Report. Among the remaining recommendations, Turkey partially fulfilled nine and did not fulfill ten.
The assessment regarding Members of Parliament (MPs) indicated that none of the recommendations outlined in the Fourth Round Evaluation Report had been entirely executed, while three recommendations had been partially implemented. The report highlighted a lack of new information concerning the fulfillment of these recommendations, especially regarding the status of the proposed Law on the Code of Ethical Conduct for Members of Parliament and the validation of MPs’ asset declarations. Additionally, pending assessments encompass measures aimed at enhancing legislative process transparency and guaranteeing the integrity of MPs.
There have been no advancements in fostering public engagement in the legislative process, nor have there been developments regarding the ethical standards expected from MPs or the necessary training to ensure adherence to these principles. GRECO has pressed Turkish authorities to address these crucial matters urgently.
In reference to judges and prosecutors, the report delineates that three recommendations were satisfactorily met, six were partially fulfilled, and six were entirely unfulfilled. The initial recommendation, recommendation xiv, mandated judges and prosecutors to take an oath upon assuming their roles, pledging impartial and independent conduct. The second, recommendation xix, necessitated the creation of a confidential advisory system for judges to seek guidance on ethical dilemmas encountered in their roles. The third, recommendation xx, stipulated the establishment of predetermined criteria for the reassignment of cases from prosecutors, along with a requirement for written justifications behind such decisions.
None of the recommendations pertaining to ethical guidelines for judges and prosecutors, as well as the establishment of impartial, independent, and transparent mechanisms to oversee adherence to these principles, have been fully enacted.
The report highlighted the necessity to supplement the Declaration on Judicial Ethics with practical guidance tailored for judges and prosecutors. GRECO reiterated that this guidance should consider the unique responsibilities of each profession, providing explicit examples, preferably in distinct documents. Emphasizing the urgency, GRECO stressed the immediate need to establish precise and objective criteria defining the ethical conduct and integrity expected from judges and prosecutors.
The report underscored the necessity for more extensive reforms to entirely enact the GRECO recommendations, particularly in diminishing the executive’s role and influence concerning crucial judiciary matters. Additionally, it highlighted the absence of measures aimed at altering the composition of the Council of Judges and Prosecutors, which does not align with European standards. Urgent attention was stressed regarding the involuntary transfer of judiciary members, signifying an issue that demands immediate resolution.
Furthermore, these shortcomings are not newfound; they have been consistently highlighted in reports spanning several years. Despite this, the government lacks the determination to address these issues, even superficially. The recent public announcement of a 67-article judicial reform package fails to incorporate measures ensuring the judiciary’s impartiality and independence, specifically concerning the concerns outlined in the Report. Moreover, there is a lack of regulation mandating the judiciary’s adherence to decisions from the Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).
* Ali Rıza Çoban – Constitutional Lawyer
The State of the Opposition as Local Elections Approach
With the March 31, 2024 local elections looming in less than three and a half months, political parties are deeply entrenched in diplomatic maneuvers and strategic planning to bolster their prospects. This includes efforts directed both against rival coalitions and within their own blocs. The ruling AKP appears to have momentarily set aside the recent crisis with its partner MHP over the alteration of the 50+1 percent rule, at least until the conclusion of the local elections. Both parties have publicly declared their intention to collaborate for success in the upcoming local elections. While specific details regarding party nominations in different regions remain unclear, the overarching commitment to the People’s Alliance persists, particularly aimed at securing victory in metropolitan municipalities.
The opposition, in stark contrast, finds itself fragmented and marked by internal discord. The elections in May triggered substantial transformations within the internal frameworks of the parties and altered their inter-party dynamics. Notably, there have been profound shifts in leadership within the CHP and HEDEP. Within the IYI Party, numerous figures have stepped down, fostering ongoing internal rivalries. A pivotal point of contention revolves around potential electoral collaboration with the CHP, serving as one of the most significant axes of these conflicts. CHP leader Özel appealed to Akşener to reconsider the decision made by the party’s General Administrative Board on September 13, advocating for a collaborative approach in the upcoming local elections. However, the IYI Party’s General Administrative Board, upon reconvening, maintained its stance to “field candidates independently across all 81 provinces and electoral districts,” with 35 votes in favor and 14 against. In response, Özel acknowledged and respected this decision, solidifying the stance that both parties would not engage in cooperation for the 2024 local elections.
Turkish politics often holds surprises. There’s a chance that the CHP and the IYI Party might adopt a strategy of refraining from nominating candidates to support each other in certain electoral districts. Even if a mutual arrangement doesn’t transpire, especially in cities like Ankara and Istanbul, strategic voting among the candidates with a higher likelihood of winning could occur, anticipated by the CHP. Additionally, despite the IYI Party’s reluctance to collaborate, the limited candidate pool of the People’s Alliance in these key cities might not guarantee automatic losses for the CHP.
Yet, it’s crucial to acknowledge that local elections encompass more than these pivotal cities. Parties aiming to underscore their credibility might be steering toward a scenario where their competitiveness, alongside other opposition parties, could diminish, leading to potential losses.
The IYI Party’s decision to shun cooperation under the banner of “free and independent” politics prompted CHP leader Özel to engage in deeper discussions with HEDEP. Regarding this matter, HEDEP’s statements hold ambiguous interpretations. While acknowledging their supporters’ desire for independent participation in the elections, HEDEP executives have left the possibility open. There are unverified speculations suggesting that HEDEP might nominate candidates across all provinces and electoral districts, contingent upon no trustees being appointed to the municipalities they secure.
The aftermath of the May 2023 elections continues to echo within the opposition. The pressure to succeed in the upcoming local elections forces opposition leaders to navigate the expectations of their voters alongside internal party dynamics when engaging with other opposition entities. Particularly, leaders of smaller opposition parties seem inclined to prioritize their personal careers, the party’s brand image, organizational stability, and notably their “relative gains” over the collective gains of the opposition. This portrayal aims to describe the current scenario rather than make subjective judgments. Realistically, expecting frequent displays of “altruistic” behavior within political spheres and resolving the challenge of collective action in this manner would be somewhat naive.
* Ömer Faruk Şen – Ph.D. – Missouri University
2023 Turkish Economy and Institutional Developments
The Turkish economy faced significant turbulence in 2023, mirroring the challenges of the preceding year. These ongoing difficulties stifled the potential for any substantial institutional progress. However, a shift in economic management prompted a partial revival of institutional momentum specifically within monetary policy. This edition of the bulletin will provide a concise evaluation of the Turkish economy in 2023, examining four key areas through the lens of available data.
Economic Growth in an Inflationary Environment
In 2023, despite global uncertainties and cautious investment patterns, the Turkish economy exhibited resilience, achieving an annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth of 5.9%. This growth was underpinned by robust consumption levels and increased government spending. However, the economy grappled with substantial inflationary pressures stemming from factors such as currency devaluation, escalating energy expenses, and disruptions within the supply chain.
As of November 2023, the Consumer Price Index (CPI) soared to 61.98% year-on-year, presenting a formidable challenge for the economy. Notably, the majority of economic institutions’ initial inflation forecasts for the year fell short, signaling a capacity erosion within these institutions.
Institutional Reforms and Monetary Policy
The government’s efforts towards instituting reforms aimed at stabilizing the economy, reinstating fiscal discipline, and fortifying regulatory frameworks held crucial significance in addressing structural deficiencies and fostering a more foreseeable economic landscape. Regrettably, the anticipated reforms either remained unimplemented or, if executed, proved largely ineffective. Amidst these challenges, the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT) assumed a pivotal role in tackling economic hurdles. The Bank’s strategic monetary policy directives, aiming to navigate between curbing inflation and bolstering growth, exerted a substantial influence on the value of the Turkish lira. The exchange rate underwent significant fluctuations, influenced by investor sentiments and a range of domestic and international economic occurrences. Despite this, the Turkish economy showcased its most commendable institutional performance within the realm of monetary policy. However, given that rectifying past errors solely through monetary policy is impractical for an entire economic administration, the shift toward a more “rational” monetary policy has contributed only marginally to enhancing the broader institutional capacity framework.
Foreign Trade, Balance of Payments and Employment Dynamics
In 2023, Turkey engaged in increased collaboration with international institutions and trading partners while actively pursuing foreign investments in trade and balance of payments aspects. Despite notable exports in sectors like automotive and textiles, the trade deficit expanded owing to mounting import expenses, particularly concerning energy and raw materials. This escalation raised apprehensions regarding external financing necessities and the state of foreign exchange reserves.
The government directed efforts toward job creation and bolstering vulnerable sectors through policies like incentives, SME support, and training programs. There has been a marginal improvement in the unemployment rate, standing at 8.5% as of October 2023. However, the persistent decrease in labor force participation posed the primary challenge to the credibility of the unemployment statistics.
Furthermore, job generation across sectors exhibited disparities, and informal employment continued to represent a substantial portion of the workforce. The elevated cost of living, coupled with inflationary pressures, detrimentally impacted living standards by diminishing real incomes and intensifying the burden on low- and middle-income households.
In 2023, the Turkish economy encountered a blend of growth without substantial development alongside notable institutional hurdles. Institutional reforms, adaptations in monetary policy, and immediate strategic engagements abroad played pivotal roles in navigating this economic landscape. The government’s endeavors aimed at economic stabilization, coupled with the central bank’s responsibility in steering monetary policy, played critical roles in confronting challenges like inflation, currency stability, and trade disparities. However, the centralization of these plans, or their absence, unfortunately resulted in an inadequate institutional capacity to effectively manage the economy.
* Enes Özkan – Economist, Istanbul University
1https://rm.coe.int/grecorc4-2023-12-final-eng-4th-interim-compliance-report-turkiye-conf-/1680ada6ef
2https://rm.coe.int/16806c9d29
