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The Failure of EU’s One-Size-Fits-All approach: Türkiye’s Institutional Limits in Cybersecurity

The Brussel Effect is a concept used to describe the regulatory standards in digital field shaped by the European Union with the aim of making these rules a global norm.  One of the objectives is to standardize, regulate, and model the regulatory infrastructure for certain areas such as data protection, environmental policy, competition law, and consumer safety. When countries, such as Türkiye wish to join the European Union, or when firms from various geographies wish to access the EU market, it is expected that they will adopt those regulatory standards. In case those countries’ local regulatory outlook and private sector dynamics are not well-suited to the EU, they aim to change the local standards to make them more favourable to EU rules. This makes EU rules have significant impact on policy and business practices. However, the indirect imposition of regulatory frameworks by advanced economies can be criticized from certain perspectives. Given that Türkiye has long been mirrored EU regulations and practices, as a matter of fact, it should not passively or simply absorb externally designed standards under the guise of international alignment or perceived opportunity. Instead, such pressures must be met with strategic resistance and contextual adaptation. Presenting externally imposed models as a “unique opportunity” often masks the reality: increased costs, reduced efficiency, and diminished space for local innovation.

Given that the EU’s capacity to lead and guide its member states in various areas, Türkiye has been working to update the National Cyber Security Strategy and Action Plan in the context of new-generation cyber-threats and technological developments in partnership with the EU by enacting regulations in line with the EU’s NIS2 Directive (Network & Information Security Directive).[1] This directive sets high standards for cybersecurity governance in a number of sectors, requiring national authorities with enforcement powers and cross-border coordination. Türkiye’s National Cybersecurity Strategy 2024–2028[2] and the recently published Comprehensive Cybersecurity Law 2025[3] explicitly mirror NIS2 principles, aiming to centralize governance under the Presidency of Cybersecurity, which reports directly to the president. However, some policy experts indicate that the real challenge with Türkiye’s cybersecurity policy framework lies in the vague expectation that it should align with global cybersecurity governance standards. The critical point is that there are no universally binding global standards as not all countries are at the same level. For instance, while the EU’s NIS Directive promotes collaborative cybersecurity governance and encourages structured coordination with third countries, Türkiye’s regulatory approach remains more sovereignty-driven and security-focused. Turkish authorities tend to prioritize national resilience and threat containment over multilateral interoperability, reflecting a strategic emphasis on autonomy in cyber defense architecture. This is why the cybersecurity field has occupied a central position in Türkiye’s strategic policymaking, is recognized as a vital element of national security. In addition to that, having various institutions focusing on similar topics like newly established Cybersecurity Presidency,[4] Turkish Information and Communication Technologies Authority (BTK), TÜBİTAK (The Scientific and Technological Research Council of Türkiye) and the Turkish Presidency’s Digital Transformation Office,[5] which was recently closed, and others created fragile ecosystem for institutional capacity.  On the one hand, Türkiye has long been part of international organizations and has engaged with cybersecurity organizations becoming members to initiatives dedicated to cybersecurity. Yet, according to the NCPI (National Cyber Power Index), Türkiye has lower capacity ranking 22nd out of 29 countries which indicates a need to improve cybersecurity.[6]

Not only security-wise but also business enterprises are willing to be aligned with EU rules and regulations to be able to do business in European countries. The EU legal framework also promotes the integration of cybersecurity into the public sector to enhance security and efficiency as well as facilitate inter-regional business. However, before adopting certain regulatory practices it is certainly essential to look out for the dynamics of the target country and its institutional capacity, otherwise a one-size-fits-all approach would fail to improve. Despite having long standing relations with the EU and being part of the European Union Custom, and participating in a number of common/joint initiatives, Türkiye political, economic and social dynamics exhibits certain divergences from the EU which create disappointment in certain areas such as cybersecurity. Rather than overwhelming stakeholders with rigid regulations and frameworks, adopting a more flexible and customized approach will enhance the EU’s strategic strength. Shifting from regulatory overload towards a more adaptive and tailored operational model would reinforce the EU’s influence and effectiveness. However, Türkiye’s uncritical adoption of EU-style cybersecurity regulations which are often promoted by Brussels in its quest for global standard-setting, risks becoming a form of regulatory mimicry that ignores local socio-economic complexities and strategic needs.


[1] EU Digital Strategy: https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/nis2-directive

[2] Turkey’s National Cybersecurity Strategy 2024–2028: https://hgm.uab.gov.tr/uploads/pages/siber-guvenlik/national-cyber-security-strategy-2024-2028.pdf

[3] https://www.erdem-erdem.av.tr/en/insights/cyber-security-law-proposal-adopted-by-the-turkish-grand-national-assembly

[4] https://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2025/01/20250108-1.pdf

[5]  https://cbddo.gov.tr/en/

[6]  Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Türkiye: Critical Infrastructure and Cyber Security in Türkiye

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